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ANNUAL SURVEY OF CANADIAN LAW
PART 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Garry D. Watson*
John M. Barber**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In view of the breadth of the subject, we have not attempted to cover all
of the recent cases or developments in the field of civil procedure. Rather,
we have selected a number of specific topics and attempted to develop them
in as full and as critical a manner as a survey of this nature will permit. We
have tried to select areas on the basis of their general importance or current
interest; however, we have omitted from discussion areas with perhaps as
great a claim to coverage as some we have included. '
Our main reason for selecting specific areas and attempting to discuss
them critically and in somewhat more depth than would normally be the case
in a survey article is the dirth of critical literature in the field in Canada.
Civil procedure must surely be one of the most neglected fields of legal
scholarship in this country. 2 Perhaps the recent tendency to an increase in
*LL.B., 1962, University of Melbourne; LL.M., 1966, Yale University. Associate
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
**B.S.A., 1959, University of Toronto; LL.B., 1962, Osgoode Hall; LL.M., 1966,
Yale University. Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
I For instance there have been a number of interesting cases involving Statutes of
Limitations, e.g., Dill v. Alves, [1968] 1 Ont. 58; Chretien v. Herrman, [1969] 2 Ont.
339; Dietrich Collins Equip. Ltd. v. Ed Huss Logging Co., 5 D.L.R.3d 87 (B.C. Sup.
Ct. 1969)-all covering problems of amendment after the expiration of the limitation
period. Simpson v. Saskatchewan Gov't Ins. Office, 65 D.L.R.2d 324 (Sask. 1967),
and Cook v. Szott, 68 D.L.R.2d 723 (Alta. 1968)-two interesting decisions on renewal post diem of writs and statements of claim. Schwebel v. Telekes, [1967] 1 Ont.
541, and Long v. Western Propeller Co., 67 D.L.R.2d 345 (Man. 1968)-dealing
with the question of when a cause of action arises for the purposes of the limitation
period. See also Heppel v. Stewart, [1968] Sup. Ct. 707, 69 D.L.R.2d 88, holding that
the limitation period in the Highway Traffic Act, ONT. REy. STAT. c. 172, § 147(1)
(1960), applies to an action against the repairman whose faulty work on brakes
resulted in the motor vehicle causing damages. This holding left the plaintiff in an
unfortunate position as she was not apprised of the faulty repair until the delivery of
the statement of defence two days after the expiration of the limitation period.
2 However, recently, we have seen what is for Canada almost a flood of writings
relating to civil procedure, e.g., Haines, Criminal and Civil Jury Charges, 46 CAN. B.
Rv. 48 (1968); Haines, The Future of the Civil Jury, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN TORT
LAW 10 (A. Linden ed. 1968); HOLMESTED & GALE, ONTARIO JUDICATURE ACT & RULES
OF PAC'TxCE (W. Hemmerick ed. 1968); WI.LISTON & ROLLS, THE LAw OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE (1970).
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the number of full-time academics teaching the subject may in the future
change this.
II.

SERVICE OF PROCESS IN DIVORCE ACTIONS

One of the basic tenets in any scheme of procedure based on the principles
of due process is that all parties directly affected by the legal proceeding
should be given notice of it, and given an opportunity to present their case.
In most matters, personal service can be effected with little difficulty, and in
the cases where the party who must be served evades service, an order for
substituted service can be obtained by presenting evidence of evasion. The
problem is much more acute, however, when the party who must be served
has disappeared and cannot be traced. In such a situation, we must either
compromise the defendant's right to notice or take away the plaintiff's right
of action under the substantive law. This issue has been raised graphically
by four recent cases dealing with service of process in divorce proceedings
under the Divorce Act, 1968. ' In all of these cases a wife was petitioning
for a divorce following desertion by her husband and his subsequent disappearance. Although not all of the cases specify the section of the Divorce
Act under which the wife was proceeding, it seems likely that all were petitioning on the ground of their husbands' disappearance for over three years. '
Since the wording of section 4(1)(c) of the Divorce Act explicitly
makes the disappearance of the spouse and the petitioner's inability to find
him a ground for divorce, it is somewhat difficult to understand how the question of personally serving such an absent spouse could arise. Inability to
find the absent spouse being a prerequisite to a divorce under this section
would seem to imply that personal service is unnecessary, since it is by
definition impossible. The problem arose in September, 1968. Mr. Justice
Stewart of the Ontario High Court ruled, in McAdams v. McAdams, ' that
a woman who had been deserted by her husband in 1948 and had been
unable to locate him since 1949 could not have him served substitutionally.
Justice Stewart held that to obtain an order for substituted service the applicant must show that there was some reasonable prospect that the material
being served would come to the attention of the person being served. Since,
Can. Stat. 1967-68 c. 24.
'Id.

§ 4(1)(c) which reads:

In addition to the grounds specified in section 3, and subject to section
5, a petition for divorce may be presented to a court by a husband or wife
where the husband and wife are living separate and apart, on the ground

that there has been a permanent breakdown of their marriage by reason of
one or more of the following circumstances as specified in the petition,
namely:

(c) the petitioner, for a period of not less than three years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition, has had no knowledge
of or information as to the whereabouts of the respondent and, throughout
that period, has been unable to locate the respondent.
5 [1968] 2 Ont. 784, 70 D.L.R.2d 582 (High Ct.).
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on the facts of the case, ' there was no method of substituted service which
offered any reasonable prospect of giving notice, the judge held that he could
not make the order. He took the position that he was unable to dispense
with the service because rule 792 of the Matrimonial Rules provided specifically for dispensing with service only in the case of a respondent other than
the respondent spouse. ' He held that by making a specific rule for dispensing with service and exempting the respondent spouse from its provisions the
rules committee had said in effect that there was no power to dispense with
service upon a respondent spouse though he may have vanished many years
ago. Having found that he could neither dispense with service nor order
substituted service, the judge adjourned the application sine die pending the
availability of further information as to the whereabouts of the absent spouse.
Because of the circumstances of the case, ' it is clear that the effect of this
ruling was to dismiss the petitioner's divorce petition.
In October, 1968, the ruling in McAdams was disapproved by another
Ontario High Court judge in Sutt v. Suit. ' In this case, Justice Parker
took the position that a petitioner should not be prevented from obtaining
relief because she could not locate her husband in order to serve him with
process. He found that the legislature, by permitting a divorce on the basis
of the disappearance of the spouse for three years, contemplated the granting
of relief in situations of this kind and that this intention of the legislature
was sufficient to provide for an exception to the general rule that substitutional
service should not be ordered unless there is some reasonable prospect of
the service coming to the attention of the person to be served. In fact he was
prepared to make an order even if there was no possibility that the respondent
would be notified. In view of the conflict between his view and that expressed by Stewart in McAdams, Justice Parker referred the case to the
Court of Appeal pursuant to section 32 of the Judicature Act 10to resolve
the conflict and make the appropriate order. The Court of Appeal " held
that an order for substituted service should be made.
In making the order, the Court of Appeal took the position that a procedural rule should not be interpreted to frustrate the purpose of the
substantive law, which in this case gave the petitioner a right to a divorce.
The court was sympathetic to the wife's position, and generally unsympathetic
to the claim of the respondent spouse with regards to notice of the pro6Id.at 784, 70 D.L.R.2d at 582. Not only had the wife not heard from him
since 1949, no member of his family-all of whom the wife had contacted-know of
his whereabouts.
'Ont. Reg. 156/68, § 17, rule 792 which reads: "A judge may dispense with
service of the notice of petition and other documents on a respondent, other than the
respondent spouse, who cannot be found if no claim is made against him, or if made,
is abandoned."
8
Supra note 6.
9[1968] 2 Ont. 786, 70 D.L.R.2d 584 (High Ct.).
10ONT. REv. STAT. c. 19, § 32(1) (1960) which provides that "[i]f a judge deems
a decision previously given to be wrong and of sufficient importance to be considered
in a higher court, he may refer the case before him to the Court of Appeal."
112 D.L.R.3d 33 (Ont. 1968).
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ceedings in cases where he had deserted and disappeared. However, the
majority were not prepared to support the suggestion of the judge of first
instance that substitutional service should be ordered even in situations where
there was no possibility that notice of the petition would come to the attention of the respondent. Rather, the Court of Appeal held that the mode of
service ordered must "render it reasonably possible rather than reasonably
probable that service so effected would bring knowledge of the proceedings
to the respondent spouse."" Unfortunately, the court gave no satisfactory
indication of when, if ever, substituted service would be denied under this
standard. They, therefore, left the matter open so that in subsequent cases
courts may feel obliged to deny an order for substituted service on the ground
that the chances of notice coming to the attention of the respondent are so
remote as to make it less than "reasonably possible" that he would be notified.
In a concurring judgment, Mr. Justice Jessup held that there were no
circumstances in which the court can ultimately decline to make an order
for substitutional service of a petition founded on section 4(1) (c)of the
Divorce Act and that the mode of service selected should be the one offering
the best possibility of notice of the proceedings to the respondent. This
solution would have ensured that no petitioner would be denied a divorce
simply because his spouse had disappeared. However, the majority decision
has left the matter in doubt.
While the decision of the Court of Appeal resolved the particular problem of the petitioner in Sutt v.Sutt, the solution is still far from satisfactory.
One can only speculate on how the majority opinion of the court will be
applied in situations such as the one dealt with by the British Columbia
court in Myers v. Myers. " There the respondent had deserted the petitioner after only three months of marriage and at the same time he deserted
the army. A number of factors made it impossible to select any method of
service which would bring the proceedings to the attention of the respondent.
Twenty-eight years had passed since the desertion. An army deserter, as much
as anyone, seems likely to stay away from areas where he might be known,
and thus, he is no more likely to be in one city or town in North America
than any other. The British Columbia court resolved the problem by ordering substituted service by posting a sealed copy of the petition in the main
post office in the city where the couple had been married. In Ontario, it
seems likely that such an order, or any order for substituted service in such
a case, would be difficult to obtain because of the requirement laid down by
the Court of Appeal that the mode of service employed must make it reasonably possible that the respondent will be notified. In this situation, no mode
of service, except perhaps advertising on national radio or television, would
make it reasonably possible for the respondent to be notified. Thus, if the
reasoning of the Ontario court were to be applied, it is quite possible that a
petitioner such as Mrs. Myers would be denied a divorce.
Ild. at 41 (emphasis added).
"65 W.W.R. (n.s.) 575, 70 D.L.R.2d 586 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968).
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Although the Myers decision resolved the problem of that particular
wife, it must be clear to all who were involved in the case that the procedure
adopted was a meaningless formality. "' Such procedures not only delay the
proceedings while the petitioner awaits an answer which will never come, but
they are the sort of procedure which makes the legal process a subject of
derision. Surely, this case will make clear to the procedural rule-makers of
the country 1 the need to give serious consideration to promulgating a rule,
similar to that existing in the United Kingdom, " which will specifically permit the court to dispense with service in cases similar to Myers. Such a rule
will avoid annoying delays, the wasting of money on futile advertising and at
the same time have the advantage of a realistic and honest way of dealing
with the situation where the respondent has disappeared.
The onerous burden of the expense of substituted service received attention in the British Columbia case of Watts v. Watts. 1" In arriving at his
14

In Watts v. Watts, 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 233, 70 D.L.R.2d 621 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
1968), Mr. Justice Aikins described the ordering of substituted service in such circumstances as the making of "what really is no more than a pro forma order with no
real expectation that it will be effective." Id. at 234, 70 D.LR.2d at 622.
Under the Divorce Act of 1968, a general rule-making power is given to the
superior courts of each province and to the Exchequer Court, see Can. Stat. 1967-68
c. 24, § 19(1) and § 2(e) and (f). Notwithstanding this grant, § 19(2) provides that
the "Governor in Council may make such regulations as he considers proper to assure
uniformity in the rules of court made under this Act" and that when made such regulations prevail over rules made by the courts under § 19(1). The provision of a
power in the courts to dispense with service in appropriate cases could thus be achieved,
it would seem, by the Governor in Council exercising this power.
16 U.K. MATRIMONIAL CAUsEs R. 14(10) (1968) states: "Where it appears necessary or expedient to do so-(a) a judge may by order dispense with service of a copy
of a petition on a respondent spouse, .... "
A similar power to dispense with service was contained in the U.K. MATIMONIAL
CAUSES R. 9(5) (1957). The cases under this earlier provision are collected in 2 Tim
Sup. Cr. P. § 1648 (1967).
The need for a rule of this nature becomes even more apparent when one observes that the basis of the Ontario Court of Appeal's "liberal" approach to substituted
service (the normal rule is that there must be a reasonable probability of the substituted service coming to the attention of the defendant or respondent, see Sutt v. Sutt,
[1968] 2 Ont. 786, at 787, 70 D.L.R.2d 584, at 585) in Sun seemed to turn on the fact
that the ground relied on by the petitioner was § 4(1) (c) of the Divorce Act-ignorance
of knowledge or information of the whereabouts of the respondent for the last three
years. See 2 D.L.R.3d 33, at 40 (Ont. 1968) (per Schroeder) and at 42 (per Jessup).
It is far from clear that the court was directing that the normal rule could be relaxed in
all divorce cases. Yet the types of problems encountered in the cases discussed in the
text are not peculiar to the situation where the petition is founded on § 4(1) (c) of the
Divorce Act. For example, how would an Ontario court deal with the situation of a
petitioner who deserted her spouse six years ago (see § 4(1)(e)) but has not known
of his whereabouts for the last two years, or that of a petitioner whose husband committed adultery (see § 3(a)) six months ago and has since disappeared? To enable

such petitioners to avail themselves of the substantive provisions of the Divorce Act of
1968, power should be granted to the courts to dispense with service where it appears
necessary or expedient to do so.
1 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 233, at 235, 70 D.L.R.2d 621, at 622 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968).
Mr. Justice Aikins documents in some detail the cost of newspaper advertising in
several provincial capitals. Apparently, the cost could range from twenty-five dollars
to 150 dollars depending on the city and the number of successive advertisements
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decision in that case, the judge took into account the high cost of advertising in large metropolitan newspapers-as high as nine dollars and seventyfive cents per inch of space in the Toronto Star-and ordered publication
of a relatively abbreviated notice. "8 Even with an abbreviated notice, the cost
in most metropolitan newspapers will be in excess of twenty dollars per entry.

Also, a single entry is only remotely likely to come to the respondent's notice.
The Engish courts have been hesitant to dispense with service in cases where
the petitioner was financially unable to bear the cost of service. ' But surely
such an approach fails to give sufficient weight to the fact that the cost of
newspaper advertisements may alone prohibit many from obtaining a
divorce." Dispensing with substituted service is admittedly not a panacea
for the overall problem of the expense of divorce proceedings, but it would at
least remove some barriers for those seeking relief.
The rule-makers should also direct their attention to the forms of relief
to be granted on a petition which has not been personally served on the respondent. Regarding the relief of divorce itself, it is unlikely that a deserting
spouse will have any objections to a divorce which is worthy of serious consideration. In fact, we can probably assume he or she will not oppose a
divorce decree being obtained where there has been separation without contact for three years. Lack of personal service should not be a weighty consideration where the petitioning spouse satisfies the court that there has been
long term desertion without contact. "
A somewhat more difficult problem is posed by the related issues of
custody and support, where the petitioner makes a claim for either in the
action. But here again, if the respondent spouse has been out of contact
with the children for three years there is probably little harm in making a
ordered. The abbreviated notice ordered in this case--to be published in the weekend
editions of two Toronto newspapers-would cost approximately sixty dollars.
18The parties had married in Toronto in 1955 and the petitioner had last seen
her husband there in 1961. Since then his whereabouts were unknown. On the
ground that there was no indication that he had left Toronto, the judge ordered service
by newspaper advertisement there, refusing the requested order for service by posting
the petition on a notice board in the district registry office in Vancouver.
"sSee Weighman v. Weighman, [1947] 2 All E.R. 852 (C.A.).
2
However, in Ontario the legal aid plan will, where necessary, meet the -ost of
substituted service in divorce cases. Pursuant to the discretion given by Oat. Reg.
257/69, Schedule 6(ix), the director and legal accounts office approve average amounts
of seventy to ninety dollars for this disbursement, though amounts as high as 150 to
200 dollars have been approved.
1
Satisfying the court on this point could be a difficult and expensive process
depending on the standard set by the court. If the court accepts an affidavit by the
spouse specifically denying knowledge of the absent spouse and outlining the steps taken
to contact that spouse, obtaining an order would be relatively simple. If the court is
concerned that a spouse who is anxious to obtain a divorce may swear to a false
affidavit, evidence of a private investigator would make fraud less likely, but would also
increase the cost of obtaining the order, perhaps even to a point where it would be as
expensive as placing an advertisement. A preferable approach might be to require an
affidavit from the wife together with an affidavit by the lawyer setting out that he has
to the best of his ability satisfied himself that the contents of the affidavit of the petitioner are accurate.
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custody order without service. In any event, the custody order can be varied
or rescinded by the court on the application of the absent spouse should
he return.

2

The question of maintenance is a more complex one. It is unlikely that
most wives will be concerned with obtaining a maintenance order against
someone whom they are unable to locate. There may be other wives, however, who wish to obtain a maintenance order which can be used against the
spouse in the event he returns. The threat of an order which has accumulated into a large amount over a long period of time could be a serious consideration for someone who has acquired a considerable amount of property
during his period of absence. The most sensible approach to this type of
situation would be to make it clear in the legislation and the matrimonial
rules that an application for maintenance can, in such circumstances, be made
in the action at any time following the decree nisi. " If this were coupled
with an amendment clearly empowering the court to make a lump-sum payment to compensate the wife for any disparity between her income and that
of her husband during the period of his absence, "4any incentive a wife may
have for taking ex parte maintenance proceedings at the time of the divorce
would be removed. Such amendments would avoid the possibility that a
respondent might be faced with an accumulated maintenance order about
which he was never informed. It seems preferable that the matter of maintenance only be considered when there is at least a reasonable probability
"'Can. Stat. 1967-68 c. 24, § 11(2).
§ 11(1). At the present time there is some doubt, on the strict wording
of the various provisions, whether an application for maintenance can be made after
the divorce has been granted. The act, id. § 11(1), provides:"Upon granting a decree
nisi of divorce, the court may, if it thinks fit and just to do so having regard to the
conduct of the parties and the condition, means and other circumstances of each of
them, make one or more of the following orders, namely: . . . ." (emphasis added).
The § then sets out the forms of maintenance and custody orders which can be made.
The problem of when the application for maintenance can be made turns on the interpretation of the word "upon." It seems likely that a court would interpret the word
broadly and permit an application after the divorce decree. This is in keeping with
the earlier case law which has generally permitted applications after the divorce decree.
See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 42 W.W.R. (n.s.) 634 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1963); Simmonds v.
Simmonds, [1955] 2 All E.R. 481 (Divorce Ct.); Fisher v. Fisher, (1942] 1 All. E.R.
438 (C.A.). However, to remove all doubts, it would be desirable to clarify the point
by specifically spelling out in the § that an application for maintenance can be made
at any time following the decree nisi. It might perhaps be desirable to require leave
for late application as is the case in England. See U.K. MATRIMONIAL CAUsas R. 3(3)
(1957), 2 Tm Sup. CT. P. § 1635 (1967). See also rule 44(1), id. at § 1691 which
permits the application at any time. However, in a recent decision interpreting the
meaning of the words "upon granting a decree nisi," a British Columbia court held that
because of this wording it had no jurisdiction to make a maintenance order to take
effect at some indefinite future date. Todd v. Todd, 5 D.L.R.3d 92 (B.C. Sup. Ct.,
Local Ct. Judge, 1969). Because of the peculiar facts of the case (the wife had supported herself without help for ten years) and because the judge did not refer to any
of the earlier English or Canadian jurisprudence on the matter, a different interpre.
tation 24would still seem to be open in a different jurisdiction.
This could occur when the deserted wife, left alone with several children, is
forced to live on welfare while the absent husband is earning, or she believes he may
be earning, a considerable income.
231Id.
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that the proceedings will come to his attention.
I1.

TIRD-PARTY PRACTICE

Third-party practice is the procedural device whereby a party to an
action may bring in an additional party and claim against such party because
of the claim that is being asserted in the action against the original party. "
The reasons behind the practice are a combination of fairness to the (original)
defendant, fairness to the third party and efficient and sound administration of
justice. Great drawbacks characterized the old common-law procedure
which required the defendants to assert any claims over against third parties
arising out of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff in a later, separate
action. The principle of res judicata (a judgment is finally binding only
on those who were parties thereto and had an opportunity to be heard on
the issues decided) applicable to in personam actions, while a necessary
and just one, placed the defendant in an unfortunate if not invidious position.
Since the third party was not a party to the original action between the
plaintiff and defendant, he was not bound by the determination in that action.
Consequently, in the second action, the defendant was frequently put to the
trouble and expense of again proving matters already determined in the
original action with the ever present possibility of embarrassment to the
defendant and to the legal system because the findings in the original and
in the later action might differ. 6 Further, this mode of proceeding could
leave the defendant in the position of having to wait a considerable time
before finally establishing his claim against the third party, while all the time
the plaintiff's judgment was enforceable against him."
Moreover, in requiring this duplicity of actions, the procedure was expensive for the defendant and for the legal system. "'
It was with the object of overcoming these draw-backs of the commonlaw procedure that the first Report of the Royal Commissioners in England
laid the foundation for modern third-party practice. They recommended
that "where the defendant is or claims to be entitled to contribution or to
indemnity or other relief over against any other person or persons, or where
from any other cause it shall appear to the court fit that a question in the
suit should be determined not only as between the plaintiff and defendant,
and any other person, the court should have power to make such order as may
be proper for the purpose of having the question so determined.""
2"1.
1

6

MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14-02[l] (1950-1968).

Barclays Bank v. Tom, [1923] 1 K.B. 221, at 224 (C.A. 1922); Pollington v.

Cheeseman, 23 Ont. W.R. 639, at 640 (High Ct. Chambers 1912); Hall (Western)
Associates Ltd. v. Trident Constr. Ltd., 65 W.W.R. (n.s.) 415, at 417, 69 D.LR.2d
495, at 496 (Man. 1968).
27 Barclays Bank v. Tom, [1923] 1 K.B. at 224.
1 Id.; Hall (Western) Associates Ltd. v. Trident Constr. Ltd., 65 W.W.R. (n.s.) at
417, 69 D.L.R.2d at 496.
29"Tm RoYAL CoMMnssiONER REPORTS (1867-1874), Frnsr REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONERS 12 (1869), cited in, Cohen, Impleader: Enforcement of Defendant
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The common feature of third-party practice which spread through the
common-law world following this recommendation"0 is that in cases where
the procedure is available, the defendant may join the third party as a party to
the action between himself and the plaintiff. The third party is then given the
right to defend the plaintiff's action against the defendant and if the plaintiff
succeeds, and the defendant establishes his claim against the third party,
the defendant will obtain a judgment against the third party in the same
action as he suffers judgment in the plaintiff's favour.
In Ontario, a perennial problem of third-party practice has been the
scope of its availability. The rules of practice of that province permit the
issuance of a third-party notice whenever the defendant claims to be entitled
to "contribution or indemnity from or any other relief over against any
person not a party to the action." " The type of claims that are to be included under the heading "contribution or indemnity" has caused relatively
few problems. " However, the term "any other relief over" has been the
source of a great deal of litigation, restrictive interpretation and uncertainty.
Despite the fact that the courts have often stated that the rule is remedial and
should receive a liberal interpretation, 5 ' qualifications have been placed upon
it. The result has been that third-party proceedings were rejected in many
cases in which the theory of third-party procedure would seem to indicate
clearly that it could be used. The qualifications have been numerous. "
The right to serve a third-party notice has been refused where the defendant's
right of action against the third party was technically independent of the
outcome of the plaintiff's action, even though the defendant sought by thirdparty action to recover compensation for the damages he might have to pay
the plaintiff. For example, in Mitx v. Eastern & CharteredTrust Co., where
the plaintiff's action was brought against a defendant occupier for negligence
respecting injuries suffered when she slipped on a rug in the defendant's
premises, the defendant was denied the right to join as a third party the company with whom the defendant had a contract for supply and maintenance
of the rug. The ground for this refusal was that, technically, the defendant
could pursue its claim against the third party for breach of contract regardless
Rights Against Third Parties, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 1147, at 1169-70 (1933). For a
historical summary of the English and Ontario third-party practice rules indicating the
extent to which the Royal Commissioners' recommendations were implemented, see
id. at 1169-76 and 1182-85; HOLMESTED & LANGTON'S, ONTAro JuDIcATuRE AcT &
RuLEs oF PRACTXcE 740-56 (5th ed. D. MacRae 1940), and 2 HOLMESTED & GALE,
ONTARIO JUDIcATURE Acr & RULES OF PP.AcIc E rule 167, §§ 1, 3 & 59 (W. Hemmerick ed. 1968).
oCohen, supra note 29, documents the development of the practice in England,
the United States and the Commonwealth.
"1ONT. R.P. 167(1).
"2See 2 HOLMESTED & GALE, ONTARIO JuDIcATuRE Acr & RULES OF PRAcTIcn
rule 167, §§ 2, 14 & 51 (W. Hemmerick ed. 1968).
"E.g., Swale v. C.P.R., 25 Ont. L.R. 492, at 505 (Div. Ct. 1912). See also 2
HOLMESTED & GALE, supra note 32, rule 167, § 7.
"For a full listing and discussion of all the qualifications see 2 HOLMESTED &
GALE, supra note 2, rule 167, §§ 59-74.
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of the success of the plaintiff's claim.'
The past cases have also held that
there must be an equivalence in the measure of damages in the two actions,
or as it has sometimes been stated, that the same principle for assessing
damage must be applicable to both the main action and the third-party proceeding.'

Further, it was held, inter alia, in Drabik v. Harris,' that an

action for deceit could not be the subject of third-party proceedings.
Such restrictive qualifications create problems for defendants. When
third-party procedures are denied to them, they are left subject to all of the
hazards and drawbacks of the former common-law procedure. In at least
some of the recent cases, the Ontario courts, evidencing concern for this
problem, have extended the scope of this procedure.
In Clarkson Co. v. Kapp,' the Court of Appeal permitted a claim
for relief over based on deceit. The claim of the plaintiff against the defendant in the case was for the recovery of dividends paid out of capital, "
and the defendant directors sought relief over against their company's accountants on the ground, inter alia, that the accountants had fraudulently
represented that there was a surplus on hand for distribution. In permitting
this claim to be asserted by third-party proceedings, Mr. Justice Schroeder
distinguished Drabik as a "decision on its own peculiar facts."
He held
that the third-party action was appropriate here since the claim for relief over
was "not independent of the result of the plaintiff's action; that if the plaintiff's action against the defendants should fail, the defendants' claim against
the third party would be thereby defeated; and in any event the measure of
damages as between the plaintiff and defendants is the same as between tile
defendants and the third party." '
In the subsequent case of Allan v. Bushnell T.'. Co., "' Mr. Justice

Laskin delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal. He dealt in a more
forthright manner with the question of restrictions on the availability of the
procedure and showed a determination to broaden its availability and to
clarify exactly when it may be used. In that case, the main action was
one for libel arising out of a television news broadcast, and the defendant
broadcasting company served a third-party notice. By this notice, they
claimed relief over against the company which had supplied the news
dispatch upon which the broadcast had been based, alleging that it was an
implied term of the contract between them that the dispatches would contain
"[1966] 1 Ont 1 (York County Ct. 1965).
'See Drabik v. Harris, [1955] Ont. W.N. 590, at 591-92 and cases there cited.
See also 2 HOLMESTED & GALE, supra note 32, rule 167, §§ 62-63.
"rSupranote 36. See also McGlade v. Pashnitzky, 50 Ont. L.R. 547 (1921).
1 [1967] 1 Ont. 592.
39 Contrary to The Corporations Act, ONT. REv. STAT. c- 71, § 67(3) (1960).

0[1967] 1 Ont at 593.
Id. at 594 (emphasis added). In a subsequent case, Atlantic Acceptance Corp.
v. Zaborsky, [1968] 2 Ont. 273 (High CL), the defendant, who was sued as the maker
of a promissory note, was permitted to maintain a third-party action alleging fraudulent
alteration of the note. Mr. Justice Donohue considered the third-pary action to be
one for deceit, and, in allowing it, he relied, inter alia, on the Clarkson case.
[1968l 1 Ont. 720.
41
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only accurate information and would not expose the defendant to libel
suits. "' In permitting the third-party proceedings, Laskin rejected from the
outset objections that such proceedings were inappropriate in a libel
action, and that the main action and the third-party issue were founded upon
different causes of action. On the latter point, he ruled that there was no
requirement that there be a similarity in the form of action in the two proceedings. More important, however, he held that an equivalence in the
measure of damages could no longer be demanded as a prerequisite to the
permissibility of third-party proceedings. He acknowledged that cases such
as Drabik v. Harris" and Miller v. Sarnia Gas & Electric Co.' had made
this a prerequisite, but he rejected this as an impermissible gloss on rule 167.
He then went on to state his view as to what was essential to a claim "for
relief over" by way of third-party proceedings:
What, in my view, is central to resort to third party proceedings is
that the facts upon which the plaintiff relies against the defendant should
issue out of the relations between the defendant and the third pary. I prefer this mode of expression to statements in the cases that there must be a
common question or common questions between the plaintiff and the defendant and between the defendant and the third party. Since the "relief
over" of which Rule 167 speaks means relief over in respect of the plaintiff's claim (see Dipasquale et al v. Muscatello, [1955] O.W.N. 1001 at
p. 1004), there must be a connection of fact or subject-matter between the
cause of action upon which the plaintiff sued and the claim of the defendant
for redress against the third party; and, such claim would ordinarily arise
out of relations between the defendant and the third party anterior to those
between the plaintiff and the defendant which precipitated the main
action."

Not all the recent Ontario cases, however, have helped to expand the
availability of third-party procedure." Two cases concerning attempted
third-party proceedings to recover indemnity under insurance policies represent a backward step. The issue in these cases was the effect to be given
to clauses in the insurance policies which purported to deny the defendant
the right to institute an action against the insurer prior to the insured defendant himself suffering judgment. As early as 1912, Mr. Justice Middleton
in Pollington v. Cheeseman ' refused to interpret the clause in such a way as
to take away the defendant's right to join the insurer as a third party. He
pointed out that to permit such a clause to oust the third-party procedure
would be to frustrate the principal policies of the practice: the securing of
"Id. at 721.
Ont. W.N. 590.
12 Ont. L.R. 546 (Chambers 1900).
46[1968] 1 Ont. 720, at 723.
4"Another case, in addition to those discussed above in the text, extending the
availrbility of third-party procedure was Slesar v. W. Funk Builders Ltd., [1968] 2 Ont.
594 (High Ct.). There, Mr. Justice Stark held, on a matter of first impression in
Ontario, that the plaintiffs as defendants by counterclaim could issue a third-party
notice.
414 Ont. W.N. 410, 23 Ont. W.R. 639, 8 D.L.R. 142 (High Ct. Chambers
1912).
4[1955]
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one trial and one trial only of the issue between the plaintiff and the defendant and the removal of the possibility of inconsistent findings. However,
in International Formed Tubes Ltd. v. Ohio Crankshaft Co. ' the Court
of Appeal refused to follow Pollington " and gave full effect to a provision
in the insurance policy which expressly deprived the insured of the right to
join "the company as a party to any action against the insured to determine
the insured's liability." Subsequently, in Duff v. Perkins, " the Senior Master 52 interpreted InternationalFormed Tubes as authority for forbidding the
use of third-party procedure where the insurance policy, while not expressly

forbidding third-party proceedings against the insurer, set up as a precondition to an action against the insurer the final determination of the insured's
obligation to pay "by judgment against the insured after actual trial." The
impact of this judgment will be considerable because the clause under consideration in that case is a statutory condition in automobile insurance policies
in Ontario. "
Manitoba has recently seen an extension of the availability of thirdparty procedure. In Hall Associates (Western) Ltd. v. Trident Construction
Ltd., " the Court of Appeal of that province held the procedure was available
in a mechanics' lien action. The case involved a claim for 16,000 dollars by
a subcontractor against the owner and the general contractor for certain work
he had done. The general contractor contended that the work for which
the plaintiff claimed was condemned by the architect and that as required
by the owner, the general contractor had himself redone the work at a cost
of 7,500 dollars. The plaintiff took the position that the work had been
improperly condemned. To safeguard itself in case the plaintiff's position
was correct, the general contractor served a third-party notice on the owner
claiming indemnity to the extent of the plaintiff's claim. Over the objection
of the owner, Mr. Justice Freedman, writing the majority opinion, held that
section 57 of the Mechanics' Liens Act ' of Manitoba authorized such a
procedure. That section provides that the practice and procedure of the
Court of Queen's Bench, which itself encompasses third-party practice, may
be adopted and applied in any case not satisfactorily covered by the procedure provided for by the act. Freedman felt that this was a case where
it was highly desirable for the two closely related claims to be adjudicated
in a single action. To avoid a multiplicity of actions and the possible embarrassment of discordant findings, section 57 should be read as authorizing
third-party procedure. In so holding, Freedman overruled an earlier Mani[1965] 2 Ont. 240, 50 D.L.R.2d 214.
oInstead they preferred and followed the decision in Piper v. Spence, [1925] 1
W.W.R. 521, [1925] 1 D.L.R. 334 (Man. K-B. Chambers 1924).
5 [1968] 2 Ont. 1 (Master).
s With some assistance from Piper v. Spence, supra note 50, which gave a
similar effect to a clause identical to the one involved in Duff v. Perkins, supra note 51.
53The Insurance Act, ONT. REv. STAT. c. 190, § 203, statutory condition 10(2)
(1960).
1 65 W.W.R. (n.s.) 415, 69 D.L.R.2d 495 (Man. 1968).
9

'5 MAN.

REv. STAT.

c.

157 (1954).
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toba case. " He also made reference to the fact that the position as to the
availability of third-party procedure in a mechanics' lien action varies across
the country, some provinces permitting it while others do not. ". He concluded that the outcome in any province depended on the wording of the
particular Mechanics' Lien Act, those provinces not permitting it, not having
a section akin to Manitoba's section 57.
IV.

DISCOVERY

Most of the recent cases in the general area of pre-trial discovery raise
the same basic problem. How much information must be provided to the
opposing litigant before the trial and how much can be held back by a lawyer
and his client to be used at trial, or not used at trial, as they may determine?
This issue of the extent of the disclosure to be required has arisen in a variety
of contexts recently, but most frequently in cases involving the production
of documents when privilege is claimed.
Whether the claim for privilege is based on the solicitor-client relationship, Crown privilege or on the ground that a cummunication was made
"without prejudice," the underlying issue is essentially the same. What
is to be the primary interest? Is preference to be given to securing full
disclosure before trial in order to prevent surprise and to ensure the presentation of all available information to the court, or is it preferable to permit
the party resisting the disclosure to withhold some information because of
more important values which need to be safeguarded?
Despite many general statements in past years to the effect that the
scope of discovery is expanding and that the courts are requiring fuller disclosure, " it is clear from a number of the cases decided in the past year that
there is still a great deal of information which is exempted from disclosure.
There is also some evidence that the areas of protection are being expanded.
There are clearly two sides to the question of how much information should
remain privileged. On the one hand, to compel disclosure intrudes on a
litigant's right to privacy. Disclosure may interfere with the sound administration of justice by informing a litigant of a legitimate weakness in his case
in time for him to buttress it with false evidence. In some cases, it may
be argued that to require the disclosure of information concerning the operations of government is against the public interest.
On the other side of the question, surprise and the suppression of in56 Dell v. Callum, 60 Man. 155, 6 W.W.R. (n.s.) 428 (County Ct. 1952).

57 Third-party proceedings are not permitted in mechanics' lien actions in Ontario, Simmons Bros. v. Lee, [1948] Ont. W.N. 737 (Master), or in Saskatchewan, A.P.
Green Fire Brick Co. v. Interprovincial Steel Corp., 42 W.W.R. (n.s.) 497, 39
D.L.R.2d 692 (Sask. 1963). They are permitted in Alberta, Olson Johnson Co. v.
McLeod. 25 West. L.R. 472, 13 D.L.R. 94 (Aita. Sup. Ct. Chambers 1913); and in
British Columbia, third-party proceedings are specifically authorized by the Mechanics'
Lien Act, B.C. REv. STAT. c. 238, § 30(1)(1960).
58 See, e.g., Brennan v. J. Posluns & Co., [1959] Ont. 22 (High Ct.).
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formation which can distort and impede the flow of information to the court
will be eliminated by disclosure before trial. The chance that a decision
will be based on accurate facts is thereby increased.
However, the courts often seem to be extending protection to information
because of an unstated, and at times perhaps unconscious, belief in a "sporting
theory of justice" which conceives of a lawsuit as a battle for survival. The
sharing of information is, on this theory, seen as being unfair to the litigant
who has acquired the information and likely to undermine the process itself
by encouraging the less diligent litigant to relax in the battle and rely on
discovery to provide him with the necessary material to prepare his case. "
If the protection of privilege is afforded to documents because of a carefully considered view that to request the production of such information
would cause serious harm to an important relationship, then the value of full
disclosure of information before the trial may have to be sacrificed. However, there is also high value in seeing that all information is before the court
to ensure it will arrive at a fair approximation of the truth. Before protections are provided which impede the free flow of information, we should be
very certain that the protection is vital to the safeguarding of an important
interest. Unfortunately, the courts often put most of their emphasis on the
need to protect communication, without seriously considering the detrimental
effects of protecting this information. Generally, only the former of the two
competing interests is thoroughly canvassed. Perhaps the best example of
this phenomenon is in the case of solicitor-client privilege.
A.

Solicitor-ClientPrivilege

During 1968, four income tax cases involving the solicitor-client privilege were decided by Canadian courts. " All of these cases arose as a
result of the seizure of documents from a lawyer's office during an investigation of a client's affairs by the Department of National Revenue. In all cases,
the documents for which solicitor-client privilege was claimed had come into
existence in the course of the client obtaining advice as to his affairs for
tax purposes. Since the solicitor-client protection afforded under section
126A(I) (e) of the Income Tax Act" by definition corresponds to the right
"To some extent, this attitude can be traced to the widely held view that an
individual is entitled to retain the fruits of his labour and that each man must ultimately
rely on his own efforts in the battle for survival. Much of the carry over of this
attitude to civil litigation is undoubtedly unconscious, but if first-year law students in
civil procedure classes can be used as a representative group, the concern is great that
someone may get a free ride and use the results of someone else's work to defeat the
man who has done that work. The concern is frequently so great that it stifles consideration of the fact that the end result of this free ride would be that the finder of
fact would be able to hear all of the facts available before arriving at a decision.
6'Goodman v.Minister of National Revenue, [1968] 2 Ont. 814, 70 D.LR.2d
670 (High CL); Re Milner, 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 129, 70 D.LR.2d 429 (B.C. Sup. Ct.

Chambers 1968); Re Evans & Banffshire Apartments Ltd., 70 D.LR.2d 226 (B.C. Sup.
CL 1968); Re Sokolov, 70 D.L.R.2d 325 (Man. Q.B. 1968).
6
'CAN.
REv. STAT. c. 148 (1952), as amended Can. Stat. 1956 c. 39, § 28.

Section 126A(1)(e) defines "solicitor-client privilege," as "the right, if any, that a
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provided in the superior courts of the province where the matter arose, the
decisions are applicable to the whole range of civil litigation.
With three exceptions, the courts held that the solicitor-client privilege
protected the documents from disclosure to the tax authorities where they
had come into existence during the course of obtaining legal advice. The
first exception involved allegations of fraudulent preferences to evade payment
of tax, supported by an affidavit which outlined specific events tending to
prove the alleged fraud. In such a case, an order to produce the documents
was made. 62 A mere allegation of fraud without specifics was held to be
insufficient to compel production. "
The second exception covered documents which were not created as
part of communications to a lawyer, but rather as part of the normal affairs
of the client. Even documents submitted to the lawyer to obtain his advice
were held not to be protected. "
The final exception in the above noted cases applied to documents which
were communications between the lawyer and a third party, an accountant.
The lawyer had not prepared the communication either for contemplated
litigation or for litigation in process. Two of the cases deal with this situation, Re Goodman ' and Re Sokolov. 6B In the former, the finding was that
such communications are not privileged. In the latter, they were held to be
privileged provided they were called into existence for submission by the
client to his lawyer for advice. This last exception is then rather uncertain.
In neither case did the judge examine the issues involved in detail, and since
both cases were decided at about the same time, the judge in Re Goodman
(the later of the two cases) apparently made his decision without referring
to the Re Sokolov decision. It is then an open question as to whether this
exception will be upheld in future cases. We have conflicting decisions on
the question, neither of which is compelling in its reasoning.
Whatever the exceptions, the serious questions do not concern the nature
and extent of exceptions to the solicitor-client privilege set out in these cases.
Rather, what requires examination is the need for the privilege itself in this
type of situation. With the exception of a very few documents which came
into existence after court action was contemplated, all of the materials protected in these four cases came into existence when a client sought and
obtained the advice of a lawyer to help him organize his business affairs
for tax purposes. If the decision is made that there is a need for privacy
person has in a superior court in the province where the matter arises to refuse to
disclose an oral or documentary communication on the ground that the communication
is one passing between him and his lawyer in professional confidence." However, for
the purposes of this §, an accounting record of a lawyer, including any supporting
voucher or cheque, shall be deemed not to be such a communication.
"2 Re Milner, 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 129, 70 D.L.R.2d 429 (B.C. Sup. Ct. Chambers
1968).
63Goodman

v. Minister of National Revenue, supra note 60.

Re Evans & Banffshire Apartments Ltd., 70 D.L.R.2d 226 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1968).
IsGoodman v. Minister of National Revenue, supra note 60.
r670 D.L.R.2d 325 (Man. Q.B. 1968).
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when people discuss their business affairs with professional advisors, it is
difficult to understand why the protection should be extended only to discussions with members of the legal profession, or, if Re Sokolov is to apply,
to discussions with other professionals for submission to lawyers.
There is recent authority to the effect that there is no privilege in the
case of communications between an accountant and his client when the tax
planning is being done by an accountant. " This means, in effect, that an individual's business affairs are guaranteed privacy when they are communicated
to a lawyer, but open to public scrutiny when communicated to an accountant.
Such a position is difficult to defend on any logical basis. Is there a much
higher value in obtaining advice from a lawyer than from an accountant, even
to the extent that we must encourage clients to seek the counsel of lawyers
by such incentives? A cynic might suggest that this anomalous result is
actuated by a desire to keep other professionals out of the lawyers' territory.
If we protect clients from disclosure when they communicate with lawyers to
obtain advice, surely there can be no question of withholding the same protection when they communicate with other professionals to obtain similar
advice.
A still more fundamental issue is raised by these cases. Why do we afford such paramountcy to the professional relationship of a solicitor and his
client? Why protect communications between a lawyer and a client seeking
assistance in ordering his affairs, and yet deny protection for communications
with other professionals? There is unquestionably a value in encouraging
people to order their affairs in accordance with the law. But it is difficult
to defend the position that it is more important to society for the purpose
of protecting communication from disclosure, that the communication be with
legal advisors as opposed to with either a doctor or a psychiatrist. However, the courts seem prepared to extend a privilege to communications with
lawyers, but not to communications with members of other professions"
who normally deal with matters which are more personal in nature and which
are of the utmost importance to the individual involved. It is time for a
more critical appraisal of the situations in which solicitor-client privilege
is essential to the administration of justice. Only in those cases where protection is essential should we be prepared to forego a full disclosure of the
evidence.
67 Missiaen v. Minister of National Revenue, 61 W.W.R. (n.s.)
375, 68 D. Tax
Cas. 5039 (Alta. Sup. Ct. 1967).
6 2 ROYAL COMM'N INQuiRY INTO CrWL RIGHrs, REPORT No. I, at 821 (Ont.
1968). The Report states that only in Quebec is there a physician-patient privilege,
CODE op CIVL PRocFanuRs § 308 (Que. 1965), although in an unreported Ontario
case, Dembie v. Dembie, Ontario High Court of Justice, April 6, 1963, it was held that
a psychiatrist should not be compelled to testify about confidential communications
between himself and his patient. The commission however recommended that no
such protection should be afforded doctors or psychiatrists, id. at 823, 832.
In the recent judicial inquiry in Toronto into the behaviour of Judge Kurata, Mr.
Justice Keith ordered a psychiatrist to give evidence of communications made to him
during treatment following an alleged suicide. See The Globe and Mail (Toronto),
March 23, 1969, at 4, col. 8.
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There are strong arguments to be made for the privilege where the information sought is part of the process of obtaining advice in impending
litigation. If a lawyer were required to produce such communications, it is
likely that clients would less fully confide in their lawyers, thus hampering
the lawyer in his preparation and reducing the effectiveness of the adversary
system. It is also possible that individuals would not seek the assistance of
lawyers in resolving disputes. " Both of these possibilities would have
to be seriously considered before all solicitor-client communications were
left unprotected. However, when no litigation is pending and the client
has merely been seeking legal assistance in arranging his affairs, any protection seems unnecessary and potentially harmful. There is a substantial
possibility that the ability of a court to ascertain the facts in the litigation
will be hampered if such communications are protected. If communications are revealed, it is unlikely that clients will stop seeking legal advice.
Clients do not seek legal advice because they anticipate future litigation but
rather because they wish to avoid litigation. Thus, they will communicate
freely with a lawyer to get the best possible advice. The threat that their
communications may be revealed in future litigation is a possibility which is
far too remote to affect communication. The interference will be minimal,
and the improvement in the fact-finding process before the trial and at the
trial may be substantial in a given case if the solicitor-client privilege is
modified.
Recently, the English courts have extended the protection of solicitorclient privilege to communications with foreign lawyers in a situation where
no litigation was contemplated." Further, a British Columbia Supreme
Court judge wrote a decision in 1968 which extended the protection into a
new and more questionable area. ' In this case, an insured motorist sued
his insurer claiming indemnity for damages awarded against him in an earlier

action. In the earlier action, the insurer and the insured had been represented by the same firm of lawyers. The issue of the liability to indemnify
arose early in the first action, the insurer taking a non-waiver agreement.
Although this conflict existed, the court in the second action found that the
lawyers in the first action were solicitors for both parties for the purposes
of that action. Moreover, despite this finding, the court in the action between the insured and the insurer held that documents passing between the
insurer and the lawyers in that first action relating to the question of liability
eoFor a more complete discussion of the problems which might be created by a
drastic limiting of the protection afforded solicitor and client communications, see
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947). See also Developments in
the Law-Discovery, 74 HAiv. L. REV. 940, at 1027-46 (1961), and Tolman,

Discovery under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Product
of the Lawyer, 58 CoLTJm. L. REV. 498 (1958).

"See Garfield v. Fay, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 1479 (Probate Ct.). It seems from this
case that as long as the professional consulted is a lawyer one can speak to him at any
time without serious fear of being interfered with.
71 Chersinoff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 65 W.W.R. (n.s.) 449, 69 D.L.R.2d 653 (B.C.
Sup. Ct. Chambers 1968).
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to indemnify were protected by the solicitor-client privilege. Thus, we are
left with the rather surprising situation that a client is not entitled to see all of
the information contained in the files of his own lawyer in an action in which
that lawyer represented him. Admittedly, the insurer was seeking advice
on the issue of liability to indemnify at the time the first action was being
proceeded with, and it is arguable that the issue of liability to indemnify was
not one of the matters in issue in the first action. But the information was
clearly important to the insured. It was information received by his lawyer
while that lawyer was acting for him and was retained in the same file. If
his insurer wanted to protect this information, other counsel could have been
instructed or the insurer could have advised the insured to do so. Since
this was not done, the insurer had taken the position that a single lawyer
could act for both. Granting protection to communications made in such
circumstances encourages clients to continue to instruct counsel after a conflict
of interest has arisen. ' It is a highly questionable policy which encourages
a lawyer to continue to act for two parties after a potential conflict of interest
is known to exist.
Overall, what appears to be necessary is a more rigorous approach to
the subject of solicitor-client privilege-one that attempts a genuine balancing
of the basic interests involved. In any general consideration of the problem
and in each individual case that arises, we must ask how much protection
should be afforded to solicitor-client communications and why. What would
be the costs to the administration of justice of granting the privilege? Can
granting the privilege really be justified in view of the denial thereof to other
professional communications? Until our courts squarely face these questions, we are likely to continue to see small additions made to the territory
of the privilege without sound reasons and with potentially harmful effects
on the openness of disclosure in lawsuits which is a value our courts often
seem to ignore.
B.

Crown Privilege

The right of government to refrain from producing documents and to
prevent others from producing them was reviewed by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal in the case of Gronlund v. Hansen. " This case involved
a suit brought by the widow of a seaman killed in the sinking of a fishing
vessel. The defendant was the master of the vessel and was in charge of it
at all material times. The plaintiff sought an order compelling production
' On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal reversed the trial decision
in part, ordering production of documents which related to the defence of the first
action. But they upheld the trial judge's holding that the documents which had been
prepared by the insurer in anticipation of a claim by the insured for indemnity were
privileged. See Chersinoff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 67 W.W.R. (n.s.) 750, 3 D.LR.3d 560
(B.C. 1969).
1 64 W.W.R. (n.s.) 74, 68 D.L.R.2d 223 (B.C. 1968). For a detailed discussion of the origin and present state of the law of Crown privilege see, Linstead, The
Law of Crown Privilege in Canada and Elsewhere, 3 OrtAwA L Ray. 79 (1968),
449 (1969).
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of statements made by the defendant at a preliminary inquiry held pursuant
to the Canada Shipping Act. ", On the return of the motion, the affidavit of
the Minister of Transport was filed. In the affidavit, the minister claimed
the protection of Crown privilege on the ground that forcing production
would "prejudice the candor and completeness of the information that would
be furnished in the course of preliminary inquiries respecting shipping
casualties." The Court of Appeal sustained the claim of the minister and
held that the defendant need not produce statements made to the inquiry
commissioner. The order was made without the court examining the documents in question. ' Although the court did not find that the minister's
affidavit was conclusive, " it is clear from the judgment that as long as the
claim of privilege is reasonable, the court is not likely to go behind the
minister's affidavit in testing the validity of the claim of privilege.
Most courts have now said that they do not consider the affidavit of the
minister conclusive on the issue of Crown privilege. This view that the
affidavit is not conclusive is of relatively recent origin. The contrary view was
laid down by the English House of Lords in Duncan v. Cammell-Laird &
Co. "'in 1942. This position now appears to have been laid to rest both
in England 7' and in Canada. " However, the way in which the court dealt
with the matter in Gronlund indicates that the apparent change in the attitude
of courts to the claim of Crown privilege may not be as significant as one
would expect. In his judgment, Chief Justice Davey of British Columbia
expressed some misgivings about the validity of the minister's claim, and his
analysis of the need for protection of the information casts serious doubt on
the minister's claim "' of Crown privilege. However, he upheld the claim
without looking at the docunents involved. This is some evidence that the
minister's affidavit is still likely to be treated with considerable deference even
74

CAN. REV. STAT. c. 29 (1952).
r The only documents which actually existed were the notes of the commissioner
made at the hearing and his report to the minister.
78 Indeed Mr. Justice Robertson specifically held that the court was entitled to
examine the documents in question.
Gronlund v. Hansen, 64 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 92, 68
D.L.R.2d at 239.
77 [1942] A.C. 624, [1942] 1 All E.R. 587.
7
Conway v. Rimmer, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 998 (H.L.), a decision of the House of
Lords in which the Court held that it was entitled to examine the documents in question despite a proper objection by way of affidavit by the minister with jurisdiction.
Following
examination, the Court ordered them produced. id. at 1535.
7
'Regina v. Snider, [1954] Sup. Ct. 479, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 483, 109 Can. Crim.
Cas. Ann. 193. But see the approach embodied in legislation presently pending before
Parliament to establish the Federal Court of Canada, Bill C-192, Second Session,
Twenty-Eighth Parliament, 18-19 Eliz. 2 (1969-70). (First Reading, March 2, 1970).
With regard to discovery against the federal crown, clause 41 of the Bill provides that
a court may examine the documents for which a minister has claimed privileges except
where he has certified that production of the document would be "injurious to international relations, national defence or security, or to federal-provincial relations or that
it would disclose a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council of Canada." In this latter
class of cases the Bill provides, clause 41(2), that the court shall refuse production
"without any examination of the document."
20 64 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 76, 68 D.L.R.2d at 226.
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where the claim is somewhat dubious.
Any court is understandably reluctant to upset the judgment of a cabinet
minister sworn to in affidavit form. But there are reasons why a court
should not bow lightly to such a judgment. Ideally, the person making
the decision to extend the protection of Crown privilege to any information
should attempt to balance the need to protcet a government document from
public examination against the interest that the administration of justice
should not be frustrated because one of the litigants, and consequently the
court, does not have all of the facts available. It seems likely that a minister
who has not become fully acquainted with the litigation may tend to underestimate the seriousness of the failure to disclose information on the outcome
of litigation and claim privilege where the harm to the public interest from
disclosure is not great. When faced with a choice as head of a large government department, it is undoubtedly much easier to decide not to disclose
information than to disclose it. Non-disclosure is almost certain to be safer
from a political point of view and more popular with employees in the department. Disclosure can expose departmental errors which can be politically embarrassing to the minister and lead to disruption within the department itself. Thus, the pressures to protect information both within the
department and outside it are likely to be difficult to resist. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the value of full disclosure in civil litigation will seem
very important to the minister or be weighed very heavily, if at all, by him
in arriving at his decision.
It is true that the courts may tend to over-estimate the importance of
disclosure for the administration of justice and underestimate the need to
protect government documents, but to date there is much less evidence of
that than of the opposing tendency of cabinet ministers to protect information
which is of minor consequence to the running of the government but potentially embarrassing to the government department involved.'"
In Gronlundv. Hansen, the minister expressed the concern that witnesses
might be less candid in their testimony at the preliminary inquiry under the
Canada Shipping Act if they knew that their evidence might be used in a
later civil suit. No one can say with any degree of certainty that this is not
S See, e.g., Reese v. The Queen, [1955] Can. Exch. 187, [1955] 3 D.LR. 691,
where the minister claimed the protection for letters between two departments of government concerning the transfer of mineral rights in certain lands. The court sustained
the claim even though proof of the transfer was critical to the plaintiffs claim. See

Administrative Law-Discovery against Crown in Right of Canada when Defendant

in Civil Proceedings, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1186 (1955), for a discussion of the case. See
also Whitehall v. Whitehall, [1957] Sess. Cas. 30 (Sessions Ct. 1956) and Gain v. Gain,
[1961] 1 W.LR. 1469, [1962] 1 All E.R. 63 (Divorce CL 1961).
Another illustration is the assertion by Federal Immigration Minister Allan MaeEachen that there is a long standing tradition that instructions from one officer of a
department to another are privileged documents, not for publication. The communications in question were instructions issued by the department to immigration officers
as to handling American draft-dodgers and deserters. This statement was made in
reply to a request to produce such inter-departmental communications in a debate in
the House of Commons. The Globe & Mail (Toronto), May 9, 1969, at 29, cols. 2-5.
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accurate. To prove or disprove the proposition empirically would be difficult. We should, however, ask whether the possibility of testimony being
used in a subsequent civil suit against an employer is any more likely to lead
to a lack of candor than the fact that the act provides that following a preliminary inquiry a pilot may have his licence suspended temporarily. " Since
the pilot is not a member of the ship's crew, the possibility of his temporary
suspension may not affect the evidence to be given, but a close relationship
could exist between the person testifying and the pilot, making the witness
reluctant to disclose information harmful to the pilot. This type of relationship is as likely to interfere with candor at the hearing as the possible release
of evidence in a subsequent civil suit against the owner.
In addition, it is unclear from the Canada Shipping Act what use can be
made of the evidence for the purpose of further prosecutions under the act.
This is another fact which seems more likely to affect candor than the possible
use of the information in a civil suit.
In Gronlund there is some question as to how important the discovery
of this information was to the plaintiff in prosecuting her claim. The defendant had already admitted a number of critical facts in a reply to a notice
to admit facts contained in the statement of claim. 83 It could be that the need
of the plaintiff for the information contained in the reports in question
was not great and that there was little likelihood that the outcome of the
action would be affected. Unfortunately, the court does not discuss the
question of the extent to which production was critical to the plaintiff's case.
If it was not at all critical, then little is lost in acceding to the minister's claim
of privilege. On the other hand, if the plaintiff needs the information to
properly prosecute an action and is unable to obtain the information in any
other way, a much closer appraisal of the minister's claim should be made
by the court, including an examination of the documents themselves.
The fair administration of justice is an important public interest which
deserves serious consideration in any conflict with the need for secrecy of
governmental communications. It may not infrequently be necessary for the
secrecy of such communications to be compromised in order to protect the
fair administration of justice. Gronlund v. Hansen did not seem to be such
a case because much of the necessary information had already been made
available to the plaintiff. However, it is to be hoped that Canadian courts
will consider both values more critically in subsequent cases.
C. Without-Prejudice Communications
The protection of "without-prejudice" communications written with the
view to settling litigation was the subject of the interesting Ontario decision
in L Waxman & Sons v. Texaco Canada Ltd. 8 in1968. In this case the
82

Canada Shipping Act, CAN. Ray. STAT. c. 22, § 555(2) (1952). The suspension is for not more than three days unless the minister has notified the pilot that
a formal investigation will be held.
1 64 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 77, 68 D.L.R.2d at 227.
8 [1968] 1 Ont. 642 (High Ct.), affd, [1968] 2 Ont. 452.
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plaintiff, W, sued two defendants, H and T, alleging they had negligently
caused severe damage to a piece of equipment, owned by the plaintiff, while
carrying out repairs thereon. The same piece of equipment had been the
subject of earlier litigation (or threatened litigation) between W and the
During
United Steel Corporation which had sold the equipment to W.
the course of discussions concerning this earlier dispute between W and this
vendor, three letters passed between the parties which were part of settlement negotiations. The defendants in the second action sought to have
these letters produced, alleging that it was possible that they contained information relevant to the second action. The judges hearing the case ruled
unanimously that the letters were privileged communications in the first action
and that to encourage negotiations and settlements it was desirable that the
privilege should protect the parties to settlement negotiations "against all
persons unless it is waived or brought within some recognized exceptions." '"
Thus, once a document is covered by this privilege, it cannot lose the privilege and is always protected from production. The policy behind the decision is clearly desirable. All efforts to settle disputes without litigation
should be encouraged, and some protection for settlement negotiations is
essential if people are to be encouraged to make serious efforts to settle.

In order to avoid a trial, a party may be prepared to compromise about certain
matters in issue which he would insist upon if he had to go to trial, and he
may be unwilling to make the attempt to compromise if he knows his attempt
to compromise may be used against him at trial. In Waxman, however,
production was sought not for use in the litigation for which they were
produced, but for use in subsequent litigation involving different defendants.
Is it necessary to protect the earlier settlement negotiations under these circumstances? The court said yes, on the ground that to do otherwise would
discourage the settlement of disputes. Perhaps this is true, but in most
cases it would require great foresight to anticipate future litigation involving
similar subject matter when compromising a dispute. It seems unlikely
that Waxman would have been hesitant to settle his dispute with the vendor
if he had known that the settlement negotiation letters would be available
to a future litigant in case something happened to the machine at some later
date. He might anticipate future litigation against the vendor if the machine
is damaged because of a defect about which he is complaining (and perhaps
the communications should be protected in such a situation), but it is not likely
that he will anticipate damage arising because of the intervention of a third
party. Such foresight is unusual, and even if present, future remote possibilities are unlikely to affect a litigant's conduct in the existing dispute. There
will, of course, be situations in which the possibility of future litigation will
not seem so remote at the time settlement negotiations are proceeding. One
[1968] 1 Ont. at 657 (Fraser, J.). The exceptions to the granting of the
privilege referred to in the case were: where the communications contained threats, id.
at 645, 656; where it constituted an act of bankruptcy, id. at 648, 656; where the correspondence constitutes or leads up to a new contractual relationship, which is in issue,
id. at 646, 656; and in some circumstances where fraud is in issue, id. at 656.
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such situation is that in which a manufacturer of a product has been sued
for negligent manufacture of goods. As the manufacturer attempts to settle
such a suit, the possibility of similar suits concerning the same product will
be a real consideration, and the possibility that negotiations may be subject
to production in later suits could inhibit settlement. But there is little likelihood that such considerations could have been in the litigant's mind when the
settlement letters in issue were written in Waxman. That being the case,
the need to extend the "without-prejudice" communications protection to
those letters is not critical. Looking at the situation from the point of view
of the defendants in the second action in Waxman, it is possible that information contained in the letters could be critically important to their case,
and that the possibility of a decision based on an accurate finding of facts
will be substantially reduced if the letters are not available. The court
gives no indication of the contents of the letters although the letters were
examined by the judge, so we do not know how important they were in the
action. However, if they are of any importance, it is difficult to understand
how, in a case such as this, the need for full disclosure in litigation can be outweighed by the possibility that a party to a dispute will hesitate to settle it
because of a concern that documents containing settlement negotiations will
be subject to production in a later lawsuit which arises from events which have
not yet occurred and will likely never occur.
There may be some minor concern that letters designed to achieve the
settlement of a dispute may unfairly indicate the merit of a party's position
because he is anxious to settle and has conceded matters which were not
true in order to get a compromise. This should not be a serious problem,
however, provided this factor is kept in mind in evaluating the weight to
be given to the letters.
In summary, all of the recent decisions involving privileged communications demonstrate a continuing tendency on the part of the courts which will
not find favour with those who value full pre-trial disclosure of evidence.
The tendency is to extend the boundaries of the areas protected by privilege
without carefully examining the underlying purpose of the privilege and the
question of whether the extension is necessary to achieve its purpose. Discovery before trial is an important tool for ensuring that the adversary process does not degenerate into an unequal battle between those with information and those without information, money, or facilities to acquire that
information. The possibility of this occurring becomes greater as the
boundaries of privilege are widened. While our concept of privilege remains
an absolute one-bestowing a complete immunity from production despite
the opposing party's inability to obtain the information in any other waythe extension of the boundaries of privilege remains a serious problem. As
long as this concept of absolute privilege prevails, the courts should examine
each new claim for privilege in great detail and be willing, where necessary,
to make fine distinctions. Unfortunately, the cases decided in 1968 give little
evidence that the courts appreciate this need for caution.
But perhaps what is really necessary is a re-examination of the nature of
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the privilege we accord the various types of communications. Is it essential
that in all cases privilege be absolute? Might it not be possible to make exceptions to the protection granted in cases where the opposing party is vitally
in need of information to pursue his claim or defence and can only obtain
the necessary information from documents which are otherwise privileged?
To date, the approach of the English and Canadian courts has tended
towards absolute privilege which is unassailable no matter how great the
need of an individual litigant. The information may be vital to his case but
unavailable to him because of a lack of financial resources to do investigations
or because the evidence is no longer available due to changed circumstances
or because witnesses are not available. In such cases, might it not be possible
for the courts to breach those sacrosanct areas established by privilege without seriously endangering the central purpose of the protection?
Such an approach has been taken by the American courts in the area
of the protection or privilege afforded lawyers' "work product." This approach, which stems from the decision in Hickman v. Taylor, '" grants a

qualified privilege to the lawyer's preparation for trial including such matters
as statements from witnesses and reports prepared by experts, but does not
include direct communications between the lawyer and his client which are
covered by the solicitor-client privilege. The Hickman decision permits a
court to order production of such materials when a party shows good cause.
An example of "good cause" would be the situation where the information
is vital to the case and it is not available to the party in any other way. There
seems little doubt that the Canadian courts would do well to adopt the
dichotomy established by the actual decision in Hickman. This would involve
dividing what is at present our unitary, absolute solicitor-client privilege into
two distinct protections: an absolute privilege for actual solicitor-client communications, and a qualified privilege for the lawyer's work product which
at present forms part of our absolute solicitor-client privilege. Such a step
would at least enable us to remove some of the indefensible scourges from our
law of privilege. ", Moreover, consideration should be given to extending the
Hickman decision to all of our absolute privileges. The number of cases in
which the privilege would in fact become qualified should be few, and com8 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385 (1947). In this case the United States Supreme
Court held that certain documents were protected because they were part of the lawyer's
work product in preparing for trial (a protection similar to that afforded in this country
under the blanket of solicitor-client privilege). However, in the course of the judgment, the Court made it clear that the information obtained or prepared by a lawyer
with an eye toward litigation was not always free from discovery and should be subject to production if the party seeking the information can show good cause. Subsequent decisions have ordered production in cases where good cause was shown (although the precise boundaries of what amounts to good cause are still rather vague),
see, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 118 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
For an extensive discussion of the background, subsequent history and application of the
Hickman doctrine, see J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcncn at § 26.23 et seq.
7rE.g., Crits v. Sylvester, [1955] Ont. W.N. 243 (High Ct. 1954), denying the
plaintiff, in an action for damages for injuries sustained in a hospital explosion, access-inter alia-to the reports on the explosion made by the Department of Health and the

hospital's own investigators.
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munications could continue with little fear that they would later be revealed.
At the same time, the administration of justice would be improved by having
those few cases tried with the relevant evidence available to both parties. '
D. Medical Examinations for Discovery
There was one development of some importance in the area of medical
examination in 1968. In Barwick v. Targon, " a High Court judge held
that the provisions of the Ontario Judicature Act which permit medical examinations for discovery " were sufficiently broad to enable him to require a
plaintiff to submit to a psychiatric examination. The order was sought by
the defendant in an action for breach of promise of marriage. The plaintiff
in her statement of claim had alleged, among other things, that as a result
of the cancellation of the marriage she had suffered psychiatric depression,
requiring psychiatric treatment, and claimed damages for this injury. In
making the order the judge found that if he did not permit an examination in
a case such as this he would deny "the defendant and the Court assistance
in reaching a just result" " and further, prevent the defendant from obtaining
material which was essential to the proper preparation and presentation of
" Two further cases in the area of discovery deserve to be mentioned. In Mark
Fishing Co. v. United Fishermen & Allied Workers Union, 64 W.W.R. (n.s.) 530, 68
D.L.R.2d 410 (B.C. 1968), the plaintiff applied for an order that the defendant union
be required to make a further and better affidavit of documents. Relying on early
British Columbia and English authorities, Irwin v. Jung, 17 B.C. 69, 1 W.W.R. 524,
1 D.L.R. 153 (1912) and Jones v. Monte Video Gas Co., 5 Q.B.D. 556 (C.A. 1880),
the defendant argued that on such an application a contentious affidavit may not be
used to show that the affidavit of documents is insufficient. The British Columbia
Court of Appeal disapproved of and refused to follow these early cases. They hold
that such an application may be supported by material showing the facts upon which
the allegation that the discovery is unsatisfactory or insufficient is based, and that the
judge may consider such material.
Silverhill Realty Holdings Ltd. v. Minister of Highways, [1968] 1 Ont. 357
(1967), involved the question of the discoverability, in expropriation proceedings
directed towards establishing the value of the lands taken, of the expropriating authorities' procedures in determining the value of lands. The majority of the Court of
Appeal held that the matter need not be determined because of the inadequacy of the
stated case which the court was asked to adjudicate. Mr. Justice Laskin dissented
on this point, and dealt with the question of the scope of discovery. He hold that
questions relating to estimates made or procured during the period in which preparations are under way to have the question of compensation determined by the Ontario
Municipal Board need not be answered, since they are privileged. But he hold that
the claimant was entitled to discover whether, prior to that period, the expropriating
authority had estimates of the land's value prepared by its own staff or by outside
experts, and if so, when those estimates were made and the factors and formulae considered in formulating the valuation so made. His reasons for so holding were that in
expropriation proceedings opinion evidence of experts is fundamental to the question
before the trier of fact and hence there should be wider, pre-hearing access to the expert opinions and reports available to the opposing parties.
89 [1969] 1 Ont. 1 (High Ct. 1968). We are informed by plaintiff's counsel that
he obtained leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from this decision, but on the case
being settled, the appeal was abandoned.
9°The Judicature Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197, § 75 (1960), as amended, Ont.
Stat. 1966 c. 73, § 2.
91[1969] 1 Ont. at 2.
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his case.
This case is the latest in a long line of Ontario decisions on the scope
of the medical examination, " and the first in which a psychiatric examination has been ordered. In one earlier case, another High Court judge had
indicated that he felt that the statute was sufficiently broad to permit the
ordering of a psychiatric examination, but the issue in that case was a request
for a neurological, rather than a psychiatric, examination. '" In all of the
earlier Ontario cases where the matter was in issue, the courts had held that
a psychiatric examination could not be ordered since the enabling section
provided only for a physical examination. The reasoning was that an examination by a psychiatrist was in no sense a physical examination but was
a mental examination, and to permit such an examination was to distort the
language of the statute. " It is of interest to note that in two of the provinces
permitting medical examinations the words "physical examination" are not
used in the rules governing the matter. Rather, the provisions simply refer
to examination by a medical practitioner. ' In these jurisdictions then, there
would be much less difficulty in interpreting the provisions so as to permit an
order for psychiatric examination. In Ontario, however, most judges have
felt constrained by the words "physical examination." But this form of
reasoning did not appeal to the judge in Barwick v. Targon:
It seems to me there are many cases where mental injury is closely associated
with physical well-being and separation would be difficult. Here the
pleadings make clear that association. To say that you can have a neurological examination but not a psychiatric examination is to my mind
a case of semantics. If this woman has an injury, disorder or disease of
the mind, caused by the act of the defendant, the brain in which is the
seed of the mind being part of the body, her ailment in my respectful
opinion comes within the statute."

There is substantial medical evidence to support the proposition that a
clear distinction between the mental and physical components of a disability
is virtually impossible to make, at least in the cases which most frequently
come before the courts, that is, those involving injured parties seeking financial compensation. '" As more cases involving claims for mental impairment
See the cases cited notes 93 & 94 infra.
Taub v. Noble, [1965] 1 Ont. 600 (High Ct. 1964).
9See
Larmond v. Nesbitt, [1962] Ont. W.N. 217 (High Ct. Chambers); Cohen
v. Toronto Baseball Club, [1962] Ont. W.N. 231 (High Ct. Chambers), and Nietcalfe v.
Neubrand, [1964] 1 Ont. 637 (Sup. Ct. Chambers)-all decisions of supreme court
masters. See also Smith v. Thyssen, [1965] 2 Ont. 797 (High Ct. Chambers), and
Angelov v. Hampel, [1965] 2 Ont. 178 (High Ct.)-both decisions of high court
judges.
j B.C. Sm. CT. R. 0.31b, M.R. 370v (1961); ALTA.
R.C. 217(1), Alta. Reg.
390/68. Other jurisdictions have provisions similar to those found in Ontario and use
the term physical examination to designate the type of examination permitted see, e.g.
SAsH. REv. STAT. c. 73, § 50 (1965).
"[1969] 1 Ont. at 4.
91 See Weiss, Physical Complaints of Neurotic Origin, in AN OUTLINE OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (2d ed. G. Murphy & A. Bachrach 1954); Neustatler, Psychiatric Disorders in Compensation Cases, 30 MEnico-LEGAL J. 164 (1962) and H.
's
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alleged to have been caused by bodily injury arise, we will have many cases
in which there will be a serious imbalance in the ability of the respective
parties to prove their position in court if the plaintiff is the only party who
can present evidence by a psychiatrist who has examined the claimant. The
Barwick v. Targon decision should go a long way in helping to alleviate
the imbalance if subsequent decisions follow the line of reasoning adopted in
the case.
There are, however, difficulties inherent in adopting the approach taken
in Barwick v. Targon. Perhaps the most important difficulty is that a forced
psychiatric examination is a more substantial invasion of one's privacy than
almost any other medical examination. The psychiatric examination will
concern itself with questions which delve into the very essence of a person's
individuality, probing beliefs, plans, ideals, and personal relationships with
other human beings. While other medical examinations do invade the
private life of the individual, generally the invasion will not be into areas which
are as sensitive as those touched on by a psychiatric examination. "s Such
an invasion of privacy at the instance of a civil court should only be permitted if there are strong arguments in its favour which counterbalance this
invasion.
However, the arguments in favour of permitting psychiatric examination,
at least of a plaintiff who claims damages for alleged psychiatric injuries, arc
strong. In such cases, the basic argument is the same as that justifying
physical examinations. Mr. Justice Haines has said that "by putting his
physical condition in issue through claiming damages for injury, I think it
may well be said that the plaintiff has waived any rights he has to deny to the
defendant from whom he is claiming damages, the opportunity to ascertain
the nature and extent of his injuries by suitable examinations conducted by
medical practitioners." "9 To permit a plaintiff to claim damages for alleged
PSYCHIATRY chs 4, 11 (1952). The medical evidence indicates
that many seemingly physical disorders are mental in origin and that certain neurotic
disorders are closely related to the medical history of the patient. Attempting to
separate a physical from a mental examination ignores completely the fact that symptoms which appear to be completely physical may be impossible to investigate without
a more complete examination of the person's whole make-up. There is considerable
evidence that this type of inter-relationship between mental and physical disorders is
more prevalent in persons sustaining those personal injuries which the courts are called
upon to adjudicate. Dr. Neustatler, an English psychiatrist, in discussing injuries in
compensation cases in the article mentioned above says: "Whatever the injury, hysterical
features are frequently and not very surprisingly present, though usually, . . . in inverse
ratio to the severity of the condition. That such hysterical features are common is
perhaps not very surprising, for it is asking too much of human nature to relinquish
symptoms when the alternative is a handsome reward often running into thousands."
Psychiatric Disorders in Compensation Cases, 30 MEDIco-LEAL J. at 164 (1962).
DAvmsON, FORENSIC

"See

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM.

ON MEDICAL EVIDENCE

IN

COURT IN CIVIL CASES 88 (Ont. 1965). While the distinction between physical examinations and mental examinations is hazy when viewed from the perspective of the
medical profession, it seems likely that judges who have relied on such a distinction in
refusing to order such examinations reflect a much more widely held popular view that
there is a substantial difference between being examined by a psychiatrist and being
examined by another medical practitioner.
" Taub v. Noble, [1965] 1 Ont. at 601-02 (Haines, J.).
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psychiatric injury without providing his opponent adequate means to defend
the claim is unjust. " By making the claim and presenting psychiatric
evidence on his own behalf, the plaintiff can no longer claim the right to protection of privacy since he has by his conduct demonstrated a willingness to
put his private life in question.
Another argument weighing in favour of ordering a psychiatric examination in such cases is the relatively inexact nature of psychiatry and
psychology. 101 This fact is compounded by the possibility that a psychiatrist
who testifies on behalf of a claimant in a civil action may be a person who
is frequently called upon to testify on behalf of plaintiffs. There is some
evidence that psychiatrists who make a practice of testifying on one side in
actions may form a bias in favour of the side for which they normally
testify. 10" If the courts prevent the defendant from obtaining an independent
evaluation, the court will hear evidence from a witness who is subject to a
relatively high degree of error because of the nature of his craft, and who is
made more prone to error because of his acquired biases.
The question of the court having power to order psychiatric examination in cases where the plaintiff has put his own mental condition in issue may
appear to some to be a difficult question. However, it cannot be answered
by giving only one side the power to call evidence. Either we must permit
an examination by the defendant or we must be prepared to exclude all
such evidence on the basis of the threat to privacy and its inherent lack of
scientific accuracy. To permit one side to present such evidence and at the
same time effectively prevent the other side from testing it is to seriously
limit the possibility that fair decisions will be made.
A far more difficult question is whether psychiatric examination should
10" The injustice is made clear by a case such as Hansen v. Hudson (Ont. High Ct..
Number 5863/1964, unreported.) There the plaintiff alleged that he suffered "severe
mental shock" as a result of being shot at by the defendant Hudson, a police officer.
On March 10, 1966, the senior master, without written reasons, dismissed an application by the defendants for an order "that the plaintiff Frank Hurt Hansen submit himself to a psychiatric examination by Dr. Kenneth G. Gray of the City of Toronto with
regard to his alleged psychiatric injuries." The defendants' appeal from the order
of the senior master was dismissed on March 15, 1966, by Justice Stewart, without
written reasons. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal from the order of Stewart
was refused on March 22, 1966, by Mr. Justice Haines, without written reasons. We
are advised by counsel for the defendants that the case was settled prior to trial and
that one of the factors which he considered in recommending a settlement to his clients
was his inability to obtain a psychiatric examination of the plaintiff and thereby be
properly prepared for trial.
101See Ash, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses, 44 J. ABNORNM. Soc. PsYcHOL. 272 (1949) and Schmidt & Fonda, The Reliability of Psychiatric Diagnoses: A
New Look, 52 J. ABNORM. Soc. PSYCHOL. 262 (1956). In both the experiments reported, it was found that where psychiatrist evaluated the same persons independently,
while their diagnosis agreed with respect to major categories in more than fifty per
cent of the cases, the percentage of agreement dropped markedly with respect to
diagnoses of the sub-types of a disorder. Agreement was almost absent in cases involving personality pattern and trait disorders and the psycho-neurosis. Psychoneurosis is the trait often feigned by malingerers in personal injury actions.
102 See H. DAvIDSON, FoaRNslc PsYcmuTRY 76 (1952).
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be permitted in cases other than those in which the plaintiff himself puts his
mental condition directly in issue. For instance, should a defendant who
has raised the question of the plaintiff's mental condition by alleging in his
statement of defence that the plaintiff is malingering, be able to obtain an
order for psychiatric examination of the plaintiff? 103 Here, we can no longer
argue that as a pre-condition to asserting his own psychiatric injury the
plaintiff must, out of justice to the defendant, submit to a psychiatric examination. It is not he, but the defendant who injects the issue into the
case. If psychiatric examination is really an invasion of privacy which will
be objected to by many people, it would therefore seem to be dangerous
to extend such examinations to this type of case. It would give all personal
injury defendants a powerful strategic weapon. The defendants could put
all personal injury plaintiffs to the option of submitting to a psychiatric
examination or abandoning their claim by the simple allegation of malingering.

104

V.

THE AVAILABILITY OF JURY TRIAL

This century has, in general, seen an ever increasing diminution in the
role of the civil jury. Today, the modem home and stronghold of the civil
jury is clearly the United States. In that country, the civil jury remains
inviolate behind constitutional guarantees of the right to jury trial in civil
actions. 1" Elsewhere in the common-law world, the role of the civil jury
has declined as a result of legislation and court decisions. In England, the
10

Neustatler, Psychiatric Disorders in Compensation Cases, 30 MEDICo-LEoAL J.
164 (1962), points out that there is a strong possibility that physical symptoms will be
prolonged or worsened by hysteria, and that hysteria may be consciously simulated
by the plaintiff to achieve a result preconceived by him. This phenomenon is what is
commonly referred to as malingering.
Malingering definitely introduces the possibility that fraud may be perpetrated
by a claimant whose malingering perpetuates his physical symptoms. See Hays,
Hysterical Amnesia and the Podola Trial, 29 MEDICO-LEOAL J. 27 (1961).
Psychiatric
examination may be useful or essential to exposing a malingerer. H. DAVIDSON,
FOaENSIC PSYCIATRY 170-72 (1952), deals with the problem of the malingerer in
personal injury actions, giving some criteria for differentiating between a true psychoneurosis and a malingered one.
I" Notwithstanding this argument, the U.S. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) cited In, 28
U.S.C.A. (1968), provides: "In an action in which the mental or physical condition of
a party is in controversy, the court... may order him to submit to a physical or mental
examination by a physician."
05See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 337-48 (1965). The federal constitution
guarantees the right to jury trial in civil actions in federal courts, and nearly every state
constitution contains a similar guarantee as to trial in state courts. Since they merely
preserve the right of jury trial as it existed in English history at some time past, they do
not guarantee jury trial in all civil cases, e.g., in matters historically the subject of
suits in equity, jury trial is not constitutionally guaranteed. Compare on this point
the similar Ontario provision, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197, § 58(4) (1960). The constitutional right to jury trial is held to be one which can be waived by the parties, and
statutes and court rules may prescribe reasonable conditions for obtaining jury trial,
such as timely demand, and may provide that failure to take these steps constitutes a
waiver.
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civil jury has virtually disappeared. 1"0 In Australia, the jury trial has been
abolished in a majority of states in actions arising out of motor vehicle
accidents. "' In Canada, only in British Columbia and Ontario does the
jury still play a significant role in civil cases. In Nova Scotia, juries are
used for the trial of only about two to four per cent of civil cases. " In
Prince Edward Island, about two civil cases are tried by a jury in a year. '"
Manitoba has seen only four civil jury trials in the last twenty-five years. 2,,
Saskatchewan had six cases tried by a jury in 1967.2" In Alberta and
Quebec, jury trials in civil cases are rare. ",
Detailed and comprehensive figures on the extent of the use of the civil
jury in British Columbia and Ontario are not readily available, although it
is universally recognized that in those two provinces the role of the jury is
significant. In British Columbia, ten per cent of all civil cases are tried by
a jury, "' while in Ontario one study

11,

suggests that juries decide about one-

half of all the automobile cases tried in the county of York. "u
In 1968, the civil jury in Ontario came under attack. In his Report
of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, the Honourable James C.

McRuer recommended that trial by jury in all civil cases except those based
on defamation should be abolished. 116 If the recommendation itself was
not surprising, the peremptory manner in which it was made was very
disappointing. In the report, a mere page and a half is devoted to the subject and only very brief reasons are given for the commission's conclusion.
The commission was content to document the decline of the role of the civil
106

See R.

JACKSON,

MACHINERY OF JusrIcE

IN ENGLAND

64-65 (3d ed. 1960).

This is a result partly of legislation and subordinate legislation, see Administration of
Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 6 (1933) and R.S.C.
ORD. 36, rs. 1 & 2, and partly of the manner in which this legislation has been interpreted by the Court of Appeal. See, e.g., Ward v. James, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 455, (19651
1 All E.R. 563 (C.A.). For an interesting discussion of the professional and political
response to the Ward decision, see B. ABEL-SimaT & R. STEVENS, LAwYERS AND THE
COUiRTS 308-09 (1967). They suggest that it was possibly in response to these reactions
that in a later decision, Hodges v. Harland & Wolff Ltd., [1965] 1 W.L.R. 523 (C.A.),
the Court of Appeal attempted to restrict the scope of Ward v. James. A recent, concise description of the history of the right to jury trial in civil actions in England can
be found in W. CORNISH, THE JURY 74-76, 210, 227-28 (1968).
107See J. FLEMING, LAw OF TORTs 272-73 (3d ed. 1965).
In other areas of tort
litigation, the jury system in Australia has withstood serious challenge in most states.
108 2 ROYAL COMM'N INQUIRY INTO CIvIL RIGHTS, REPORT No. 1 at 859-60 (Ont.
1968).
109 Id.
110

Wilcott v. Canadian Accident & Fire Assurance Co., 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 54, at

55 (Man. Q.B. 1968).
111 2 ROYAL COMM'N INQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGH-s, REPORT No. I, at 859-60 (Ont.

1968).

112Id.

Id.
4 Linden & Somers, The Civil Jury in the Courts of Ontario: A Postscript to the

113
1

Osgoode Hall Study, 6 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 252 (1968).
I' E.g., Metropolitan Toronto.
116 2 ROYAL CoMM'N INQUIRY INTO CIVIL RIGHrS, REPORT No. 1, at 859-60 (Ont.
1968).
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jury in England and in Canada, and to assert that a jury trial increases the
"length of trial by at least one-half, if not more," thus increasing the burden
on the unsuccessful party. The report also stated that the jury trial has
became a coercive weapon used by insurance companies against personal
injury plaintiffs. Whatever be one's personal evaluation of the worth of the
civil jury, one could surely have hoped for a more extensive inquiry with
some semblance of an objective evaluation of the arguments for and against
the civil jury by a Royal Commission making a recommendation on the
subject of its continuation or abolition.
Shortly after the publication of the McRuer Commission Report, two
articles from Ontario appeared dealing with the subject of the civil jury.
One, by Professor Linden and Richard Somers, 11 supplied empirical data on
jury versus non-jury trials in automobile cases in Ontario and indicated that
several of the more frequent criticisms of the civil jury were not borne out
by systematic investigation. 118 The other, an eloquent defence of the civil
jury by Mr. Justice Haines of the Ontario Supreme Court, 119 relied heavily
upon published empirical data on jury trials. Even given his supporting
data, one may not agree with Mr. Justice Haines's position. However, his
detailed arguments and well-documented approach is a stark contrast to the
peremptory conclusions of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights.
Early in 1970 the Attorney-General of Ontario announced that he would
seek legislation to implement the McRuer Commission Report recommendation regarding the abolition of jury trials. However, he subsequently announced that he would not at present seek such legislation. "IDA
In Ontario, recent cases on the right to trial by jury have been numerous.
In contrast to the McRuer Report's attack on civil juries, the cases seem to
indicate increasing judicial protection of the right to jury trial in cases where
it is available. The cases have reatfirmed two principles. First, unless and
until a change is made in the present statutes and rules relating to jury trials,
the Ontario courts will jealously guard the broad, though not unlimited, right
of either party to a trial by jury conferred by those statutes and rules. 1,0
Supra note 114.
E.g., that juries find in favour of the plaintiff all or most of the time, that they
consistently assess higher damages than judges, that there is greater delay in getting
to trial with a jury and that the abolition of jury trials would lead to great savings of
court and of judges' time.
19
1Haines, The Future of the Civil Jury, in STuDIES IN CANADIAN TORT LAw 10
(A. Linden ed. 1968).
119ASee Globe and Mail, April 21, 1970, at 2, col. 7, and Toronto Star, June 15,
1970, at 8. The announcement of the proposed legislation produced a controversy in
the Toronto press, fed by considerable opposition to such legislation from some members of the legal profession.
120 The governing Ontario statutes and rules are the Judicature Act, ONT. Ray.
STAT. c. 197, §§ 55-58 (1960) and ONT. R.P. 400. Actions of libel, slander, criminal
conversation, seduction and malicious arrest, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment are automatically tried by jury unless the parties waive such trial, ONT. Rav. STAT.
c. 197, § 55 (1960). Actions against a municipality for damages in respect of injuries
sustained by reason of the municipality's default in keeping in repair a highway or
bridge must be tried by a judge sitting alone, ONT. REv. STAT. c. 197, § 56 (1960).
""

118
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The tenor and actual decisions in most of the recent cases make this quite
clear. Second, on two occasions, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the principle, which is of recent origin, 121that if a party is to be deprived of a jury trial
because of the complexity of the issues or the evidence, a decision must only
be made when the complexity is actually established; mere apprehension of
complexity by a judge is not a sufficient ground for dispensing with jury
trial. This principle appears to be emerging as a substantial restriction on
the pre-trial jurisdiction of a judge in chambers to dispense with the jury by
striking out a jury notice, '" and upon the practice of trial judges of dispensing with the jury at the outset of the trial. In Otonabee Motors v. B.A. Oil
Co.,' " the Court of Appeal restored a jury notice, which had been struck
out by Mr. Justice Richardson in chambers, on the ground that the case
was too involved to be tried with a jury. The court, while conceding that
the issues to be developed at trial might well be too complicated to be left
to a jury, pointed out that as the case then stood it had not been made to
appear that the complexity actually existed. In such circumstances, the
court ruled that the matter should be left to the trial judge. In Martin v.
St. Lawrence Cement Co., 4 Mr. Justice Haines, at the outset of the trial
of an occupier's liability case, intimated that the case was one which might
more properly be tried without a jury. Upon a motion then made by
plaintiff's counsel to have the jury discharged, the judge dispensed with the
jury on the ground that the issues involved were so complex that it would
be difficult to make a jury understand them, and that the case could not be
fairly and properly tried by a jury. On appeal by the defendant from
Haines's judgment for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal stressed that the trial
judge should not have discharged the jury before any evidence had been
adduced for at that point he enjoys no greater advantage than a judge sitting
in chambers. Rather, he should have exercised his discretion only after all or
a substantial portion of the evidence had been heard. "
The recent activity of the Ontario Court of Appeal in reviewing, and in
a number of cases reversing, 126the trial judge's exercise of discretion in disIn all other cases, there is a prima facie right to jury trial if a jury notice is timely
served, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197, §§ 57 & 58 (1960). See 3 HOLMESTMD & GALE,
ONTARIO JuDIcArun E AcT & RULES OF PRACTICE §§ 55-58, rule 400 (W. Hemmerick
ed. 1968).
121Compare Ryan v. Whitton, [1964] 1 Ont. 111 (1963),
and Cole v. TransCanada Air Lines, [1966] 2 Ont. 188 (High CL), with Martin v. Deutch, [1943] Ont.
683. These cases are discussed in Binavince & Choquette, Recent Developments in
CanadianLaw--Civil Procedure, 2 OrrAwA L. Rav. 147, at 167 (1967).

'22ONr. R.P. 400.

'"[1968] 1 Ont. 573.
n4[1968] 1 Ont. 94.
11 The court then went on to order a new trial with a jury (subject to a further
order of the court) on the ground that the action was a simple occupier's liability case
without any complicating factors and that it was by no means certain that a jury,
acting reasonably, must have inevitably acquitted the plaintiff of contributory negligence
(as did Haines, J.). Id. at 95-96.
116 Martin v. St. Lawrence Cement Co., [1968] 1 Ont. 94; Sdraulig v. C.P.R.,
[1968] 1 Ont. 377, 66 D.L.R.2d 475 (1967); Nag v. McKellar, [1969] 1 Ont. 764.
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pensing with the jury raises the question of an appellate court's role in this
context. The Ontario court has recognized limits to the reviewability of the
discretion of the trial judge. It has stated that it is not its function to interfere merely because it would have exercised the discretion differently. n" On
the other hand, the scope of review it has exercised is a broad one. As was
recently stated by Mr. Justice Schroeder, the court has not hesitated to

interfere when it appeared that the trial judge exercised his discretion
"under a mistake of law, in disregard of principle, under a misapprehension

as to the facts, on the ground that it took into account irrelevant matters,
that he failed to exercise his discretion, or that his order would result in
injustice."

12

In the future, however, we may expect greater reticence on the part of
the Ontario Court of Appeal in reversing trial judges on this matter. In the
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in Sdraulig v. C.P.R., "'
the Court held the above statement of principle by Schroeder to be far too

broad. They ruled that only in the most exceptional circumstances, such
as where the trial judge discharged the jury only because he believed (erroneously) that as a matter of law he was bound to do so, 130 or where he overlooked a clear, established ground for dispensing with the jury, "' should the
appellate court disturb the trial judge's ruling. "3 It was held by the Supreme
Court, reversing the Ontario Court of Appeal, that Sdraulig was not such
a case. There, in an action under The Fatal Accidents Act, ' the trial
judge had withdrawn the issue of liability from the jury on the ground that,
inter alia" he considered the conduct of plaintiffs' counsel to be prejudicial
because he twice attempted to put before the jury a piece of inadmissible
evidence. The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge and ordered
a new trial because it could not be said that the incident had prejudiced the
defendant company in its right to a fair trial, and because the trial judge
had exercised his discretion on such tenuous grounds that it could not be
127 Majcentic

v. Natale, [1968] 1 Ont. 199, at 201; Sdraulig v. C.P.R., [1968] 1

Ont. at
12 383-84, 66 D.L.R.2d at 481-82.
Sdraulig v. C.P.R., [1968] 1 Ont. at 384, 66 D.L.R.2d at 482.
129
C.P.R. v. Sdraulig, 5 D.L.R.3d 177 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
130 As in Logan v. Wilson, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 512 (Sup. Ct.), where the trial judge
was under the mistaken belief that if evidence might tend to show medical malpractice
in an attempt to reduce damages he was bound to remove the matter from the jury.
131 E.g., where the existence of insurance is revealed in the answer of a witness.
Mr. Justice Spence, supra note 129, at 183, stated that a whole series of Ontario cases
(e.g., Fillion v. O'Neill, [1934] Ont. 716) had established this as a ground for dismissing the jury and for reversing a trial judge's refusal to do so, but indicated that
this "special jurisprudence ... should not be extended beyond that type of case."
132 The Court, while in disagreement on another issue in this case-as to whether
or not there was evidence of negligence-were unanimous in condemning and reversing
the Ontario Court of Appeal on the question of reviewing the trial judge's exercise of
discretion.

13ONT. REV. STAT. c. 138 (1960).

134The trial judge gave other reasons for this action, see [1966] 2 Ont. 111, at
119-21, but in neither appellate court were these reasons relied upon by defendant's
counsel. See [1968] 1 Ont. at 383, 66 D.L.R.2d at 481; and 5 D.L.R.3d at 181.
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regarded as the exercise of a judicial discretion at all. " In reversing the
Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada stated simply that the trial
judge had given reasons "which he, in the exercise of his discretion, regarded
as providing adequate basis for such a course in order that justice should
be done." " They held the trial judge's exercise of discretion in this matter
was not reviewable in the circumstances of this case, and in general, only in
the most exceptional circumstances limited to those already determined by
decided cases. 137
While the opinions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Sdraulig made
no reference to recent Ontario cases other than Sdraulig itself, it seems that
the Court intended to make a firm and general statement on the matter.
Consequently, doubt is cast upon the correctness of other recent Ontario
cases."33 Though the Supreme Court did not express itself in such policy
terms, it appears to have affirmed clear preference for a rule which will
maximize the avoidance of expense and delay of a new trial and which will
discourage appeals, over one that jealously guards the litigant's right to jury
trial.
The recent Manitoba case of Wilcott v. Canadian Accident & Fire

Assurance Co."3 ' illustrates, as did the English Court of Appeal's decision
in Ward v. James, "40how the civil jury can in fact be abolished not only by
express legislation to that effect, but also by a legislative change in the prima
facie rule as to its availability. In contrast to Ontario, '" where there is in
general a prima facie right to jury trial, in Manitoba prima facie the trial
is to be by a judge alone and he who desires trial by jury has the onus of
establishing the need for same. " When such a principle is administered by
133[1968] 1 Ont. at 384, 66 D.L.R.2d at 482. The Ontario Court of Appeal assigned a further ground for ordering a new jury trial-the trial judge's failure to afford
plaintiffs' counsel an opportunity to present arguments against taking the issue of
liability from the jury, and his failure to give plaintiffs' counsel the election of proceeding
without a jury or of taking on adjournment to the next sittings. In the Supreme Court
of Canada, the majority opinion, given by Mr. Justice Judson, did not deal with the
point, and Justice Spence stated that he could not conclude that the trial judge did not
permit argument, 5 D.L.R.3d at 183.
" Id. at 183 (Spence, J.).
137 Both opinions in the Supreme Court of Canada referred to Telford v. Secord,
[1947] Sup. CL 277, and Mizinzki v. Robillard, [1957] Sup. Ct. 351, as correctly stating
the relevant principles.
13871he opinions in Sdraulig would appear to cast doubt on the correctness of the
Ontario Court of Appeal's decisions in both Martin v. St. Lawrence Cement Co.,
[1968] 1 Ont. 94, and Nag v. McKellar, [1969] 1 Ont. 764.
13966 W.W.R. (n.s.) 54 (Man. Q.B. 1968). In a subsequent case, D. C. H.
McCaffrey, counsel for the plaintiff in Wilcot, was again refused a jury trial. In that
case, Kisiw v. Dietz, 5 D.L.R.3d 764 (Man. Q.B. 1969), the fact that the plaintiff had
allegedly suffered brain damage and blindness in a motor vehicle collision was held to
be no reason for a trial by jury.
140 [1965] 2 W.L.R. 455, [1965] 1 All E.R. 563. See B. AnEL-S.rrn & R. STvm.Es,
LAWYERS

AND

THE

CoupTs 308-09 (1967)

for political and professional response

characterizing Ward v. James as "judicial abolition of trial by jury."
'41 See the discussion and references supra note 120.
'1The Queen's Bench Act, MAN. REV. STAT. c. 52, § 65(4) (1954): "[A]II issues
of fact shall be tried and aU damages shall be assessed by a judge without a jury, unless
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judges who are the alternate and competing trial institution, the outcome in
any particular case is predictable. The applicant for trial by jury may be
put, as he was in Wilcott, in the unenviable position of having to convince a
judge "that the case can be more satisfactorily tried by a jury than by a
Judge," 143 or that there are some special circumstances requiring trial by jury
rather than in the ordinary way by a judge sitting without a jury, I" or even
that a jury is more likely to come to a correct and just conclusion. "' To
expect judges, when given such principles to administer, to hold that they are
less capable of arriving at a correct and just decision than a jury, is indeed
to expect a great deal. In Wilcott, Justice Wilson did not see his way clear
to make such a holding. 146 There, on an application for a trial by jury in
an action for indemnity under a fire insurance policy, the special circumstance relied upon by the applicant was a direct conflict on matters of fact.
This, it was argued, would require the court to fix a preference between conflicting testimony and thus impugn the integrity of the party whose evidence
was rejected. Such a conflict in testimony involving "hard swearing" by
either side did not, in Wilson's opinion, make the case more fit to be tried
by a jury than a judge. 147 He concluded: "the difficulty of any judicial
task is no ground for transferring it to a jury." 14
In British Columbia, as in Ontario, there is a presumption in favour
of jury trial if a litigant so requests. However, the request may be denied,
inter alia, "where the issues are of an intricate or complex character." '
This
provision was applied in York v. Lapp "' to deny the plaintiff's request for
jury trial in a medical malpractice suit against a hospital and four doctors,
arising out of the unsuccessful treatment of a broken leg which led ultimately
to the amputation of the leg. Mr. Justice Gould, in so holding, pointed out
that he would have decided in favour of jury trial, which would have been
against his own personal views but in conformity with what he believed to
be the trend in the exercise of judicial discretion, had it not been for the
otherwise ordered by a judge." Sections 65(1) and 65(4) are provisions relating to
the trial of certain tort actions and actions against municipalities, analogous to tho
Judicature Act, ONT. REV. STAT. c. 197, §§ 55, 56 (1960). A recent article, McCaffrey, Trial By Jury (Civil), 37 MAN. B. NEws 1 (1969), surveys the history of tho
right to a jury trial in Manitoba in civil actions.
'

1"
1

66 W.W.R. (n.s.) 54, at 58 (Man. Q.B. 1968).
Id.

"'Id. at 57. See also Bryce v. Northland Greyhound Lines, 62 Man. 20, 11
W.W.R. (n.s.) 113 (1953).
14 This is in line with other holdings on this subject in Manitoba, e.g., Bryce v.
Northland Greyhound Lines, id. In only two cases in the last twenty-five years has
there been a jury trial in Manitoba in cases where jury trial is optional, and one of these
was by agreement of the parties. See 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 55.
147By way of contrast, see Ward v. James, [1965] 2 W.L.R. 455, at 466, [1965]
1 All E.R. 563, at 571 (Lord Denning, M.R.): "[W]hen one or other party must be
deliberately lying then trial by jury has no equal." See also 1 Tim Sup. CT. P. 459
(1967).
4 66 W.W.R. (n.s.) at 60, quoting from Justice Freedman in Bryce v. Northland
Greyhound Lines, 62 Man. 20, at 23, 8 W.W.R. (n.s.) 202, at 205 (Q.B. 1953).
149B.C. Sup. CT. R. 0.36., R.R. 5 (1961).
150
65 D.L.R.2d 351 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1967).
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British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in McDonald v. Inland Natural
Gas in 1966. 1 In McDonald,15 an action for personal injuries arising out

of a domestic natural gas explosion, a non-jury trial had been ordered on the
basis of complexity and intricacy of the issues, both as to proof (e.g., whether
certain alleged defects were in equipment installed by the defendant company
or in equipment installed by the father of the plaintiff) and as to the applicable
law (e.g., breach of warranty and causation of damage). In York, Gould
concluded, without elaboration or explanation, that the issues were sizeable,
more complex, and intricate than in McDonald and hence he felt obliged
to refuse a jury trial.

1

VI.

JUDICIAL CONDUCT OF TRIALS

Several recent appellate decisions expressed disapproval of the manner
in which judges had conducted trials. The cases are of interest because
of the type of judicial conduct reviewed. Each involved conduct different in
kind to those matters, such as improper dispensing with the jury and misdirection on the law, which normally form the basis of appellate review of
trial decisions.
Majcenic v. Natale " was an appeal from the judgment of Mr. Justice
Haines at trial on assessment of damages for the injuries suffered by the
pedestrian plaintiff when struck by the defendant's motor vehicle. The trial
had commenced with a jury, but during its course the jury was dispensed
with, and the judge alone assessed the damages and awarded the plaintiff a
substantial sum. The defendant appealed, asking for reduction of damages,
or alternatively, a new trial. The Ontario Court of Appeal granted the latter
relief on the ground that Haines's handling of the original trial had been
unsatisfactory. The court felt that the manner used by the trial judge to
obtain a settlement placed him in such a position that he should have declared
a mistrial. " On several occasions both prior to and during the trial,
Haines had discussed with counsel the possibility of either settling the case
or dispensing with the jury. In the course of these discussions, the judge
volunteered his view as to the proper range of general damages. The Court
of Appeal thought that it was permissible for a trial judge to express an
" 57 W.W.R. (n.s.) 87 (B.C. 1966).

11

The McDonald decision is analyzed and discussed in Binavince & Choquette,
Recent Developments in Canadian Law-Civil Procedure, 2 OTTAWA L REv. 147, at

168-69 (1967).
" In Ontario, it has been long established that the proper forum for medical
malpractice suits is a judge without a jury. See the cases collected in 3 HOLMESTED
& GALE, ONTAuo JuDIcATuRE AcT & RuLEs oF PRXcnc, § 28, rule 400 (W. Hemmerick ed. 1968).
"s [1968] 1 Ont. 199 (1967), rev'g and new trial ordered, [1968] 1 Ont. 189

(High CL 1967).
'As
he had been requested to do, at the trial, by counsel for the defendant.
The court also held that a new trial was necessary on the ground that the trial judge's
questioning of witnesses had amounted to an excessive interference in counsel's conduct of the case. [1968] 1 Ont. at 203-04.
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opinion as to the range of damages when jointly requested by counsel to
do so, ' but "[w]hen the opinion is expressed gratuitously counsel is forced
to accept a risk which he did not invite and with which he should not be
confronted and the risk is particularly onerous when counsel do not agree

with the opinion expressed." ""
The case is a rare example... of reference in a reported decision to a
procedure which, though not provided for in the Ontario Rules of Practice,"'
is not uncommon in Ontario. In that province, it is the regular practice
of a number of trial judges to hold an informal pre-trial conference in chambers immediately prior to the commencement of a trial. Frequently, a major
subject for discussion at these conferences is the possibility of settlement. "'

Such a practice, which actually amounts to judicial involvement in seeking
pre-trial settlement of cases, poses a problem for a judicial process which has
traditionally viewed the judge's role as that of an "impartial" arbitrator. "'
How far can and should a judge go in attempting to obtain or bring about
a settlement of cases? The Majcenic case points out in a specific way the
general problem. What degree of involvement in the settlement process is
compatible with the impartiality we expect of the trial judge? The Court of
Appeal decision designates as incompatible one type of conduct-unsolicited
judicial expressions of opinion as to the settlement value of the case--without
directly questioning the general practice of pre-trial conferences aimed at
exploring settlement.
A wide range of opinion exists in the United States as to the proper role
of the judge in promoting settlements as part of the formal pre-trial conference provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' and by the rules
56Id. at 202. The court viewed this as being an aid to settlement and unobjectionable in that any risk inherent in the procedure was one assumed by counsel
in making the request.
"7 Id. at 202-03.
15'In Bell v. Smith, 68 D.L.R.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1968), the trial judge had conducted an in-trial conference, apparently to canvass settlement, with the plaintiff personally and in the absence of counsel. There is no indication that such conferences
with the parties personally are common in Ontario.
'The Ontario Rules of Practice make no express provision for a pre-trial conference. The rules of court of several provinces e.g., B.C. Sup. CT. R. 0.34a, R.R. 1-3,
M.R. 401-03 (1961); N.S.R. Sup. Cr. 0.32 R. 1, as amended by order of the Judges of
the Supreme Court, January 22, 1968 (effective February 10, 1968); ALTA. R.C. 219,
Alta. Reg. 390/68, do make provision for such a conference, as do the rules of most

United States jurisdictions, see infra note 163.

Whereas a pre-trial conference formally

authorized by court rules may take place quite some time before trial and may be
conducted by a judge other than the one who eventually tries the case, the Ontario
conference-when it occurs-will be conducted by the trial judge immediately prior
to the commencement of the trial. See generally, Haines, The Future of the Civil
Jury, in STurDES n-i CANADIuN TORT LAw 10, at 22-24 (A. Linden ed. 1968).
160 Haines, id. Settlement is not, however, the only subject discussed in such
informal conferences. Matters traditionally canvassed at formal pre-trial conferences,
e.g., obtaining admissions, and the narrowing and clarification of issues, are also discussed.
161Bell v. Smith, 68 D.L.R.2d 751, at 758 (Sup. Ct. 1968); but cl. Majcenic v.
Natale, [1968] 1 Ont. 199, at 203 (1967).
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 16, contained in, 28 U.S.C.A. (1960).
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of court in most states. '" Many feel that a judge presiding at the pre-trial
conference should not canvass or urge settlement upon the parties since this
will compromise the judge's impartiality '" especially where he is to try the
case. 1" These commentators and judges would share the position taken by
the Ontario Court of Appeal in regard to the trial judge volunteering an
opinion as to the settlement value of the case. Others, however, feel that
there is no objection to judges suggesting figures, provided that they are not
persistent or coercive regarding settlement. '" In personal injuries cases,
some even go so far as to approve of, and indulge in, unsolicited judicial
recommendation of figures, coupled with a high degree of "head knocking"
and coercion in an endeavour to obtain acceptance of such figures.' 7 Justification for the approval of unsolicited judicial opinion as to settlement value
range from the pragmatic belief that more personal injury cases must be
settled if courts are to continue to function and if the creation of non-fault
compensation schemes are to be avoided, 168 to arguments which attempt to
meet the accusation of loss of impartiality. Arguments of the latter kind
are perhaps worth noting as a contrast to the view of the Ontario Court
of Appeal as expressed in Maicenic. Judge Skelly Wright has jokingly expressed the view that there is little chance of any great injustice resulting
from a judge stating what he thinks a case should settle at, since that figure
would generally be the correct value of the damages, that is, midway between
what the two lawyers think it is worth. "'g In a more serious vein, Judge
Kincaid rejects the notion that any "judge worthy of his position would
allow" pre-trial conference settlement figures to affect his judgment. ITO
Moreover, he suggests that judges recognize, as do counsel, "that any terms
discussed are in contemplation of compromise only and have no bearing on
or relationship to the value of the case after adjudication. The value of a
1

A count taken in 1955 showed forty-one state jurisdictions as authorizing pretrial conferences: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, (Sept. 9, 1965) quoted in I A. BARRON &
HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE

&

PROCEDURE 833 (Wright ed. 1960).

1"See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 228; Clark, Objectives of Pre-Trial Procedure,
17 Omo ST. IJ.163, at 167 (1956).
"' The formal pre-trial conference under United States practice takes place some
weeks before the trial date and will not necessarily be conducted by the trial judge.
166E.g., Laws, Pre-Trial Procedure, 1 F.R.D. 397, at 400-02 (1940); Kincaid,
A Judge's Handbook of Pre-trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437, at 449 (1955). For a
similar Canadian view, see Haines, Criminal and Civil Jury Charges, 46 CAN. B. REv.
48, at 81 (1968).
167 See Wright, Pre-Trial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, at 145-47 (1960) for a frank
description of the practice of judges at pre-trial conferences in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Lousiana. There the judges have no hesitation in
suggesting settlement figures in personal injuries eases and in such cases, they bring
considerable pressure to bear on counsel to settle.
168Id.
169 While this particular statement may not be either very accurate or very helpful, Judge Wright's overall attitude, see supra note 167, is perhaps worthy of consideration-in an imperfect world it may be preferable to resort to realistic solutions rather
than to strive for perfect ones.
170

Kincaid, supra note 166.
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case before trial when faced by both sides with the hazards of ultimate outcome is quite different from its worth after liability has been established by
the trier of fact." 171
Canadian comment on the whole subject of judicial encouragement of
settlement has been sparse. 17 Writing in 1966, former Chief Justice McRuer
roundly condemned the practice of judges attempting to promote settlement
at pre-trial conferences. He viewed "judicial conciliation" as quite alien to
the process of administering justice according to law. ' Recently, the subject
was discussed at a meeting of Ontario lawyers active in litigation. ' A
vote taken at the conclusion of the discussion indicated a considerable, though
by no means unanimous, opposition to the practice of judges canvassing or
attempting to induce settlement either immediately before or during the
trial."
The convenors of the meeting considered that there was a sufficient
expression of opinion against such practices to bring the matter to the attention of the Ontario bench.
The subject of judicial exploration of settlement possibilities after the
trial is underway arose in Tecchi v. Cirillo. 17 In that case, it was clear
from the record that the trial judge had been convinced that every effort
should be explored to achieve a settlement in the case. The Ontario Court
of Appeal ordered a new trial, but not on the ground that it was per se improper for the trial judge to consider settlement of the case after the trial had
commenced. They seemed to imply that judicial consideration of the appropriateness of settlement at a trial was permissible. 17
However, they
held that it was not permissible for the judge to pre-judge the case or to
give that appearance. It was clear that this had occurred in Tecchi, for the
judge had expressed, prior to hearing any defence witnesses, that the plaintiff
was entitled to substantial damages.
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In Tecchi, the Court of Appeal found a further ground for awarding a
I7
d.

In addition to the comments discussed in the text see Haines, The Future of
STUDIES IN CANADIAN TORT LAW 10, at 24 (A. Linden ed. 1968);
Haines, Criminal and Civil Jury Charges, 46 CAN. B. REV. 48, at 81 (1968).
173McRuer, The Motor Car and the Law, 4 OsoooD HALL L.J. 54, at 70 (1966).
174
The Advocates' Society "Workshop," Toronto, May 9, 1969.
17,The vote indicated that of those present, seventy-one were against and fortytwo were in favour of the practice of judges participating in or attempting to induce
settlement after a case is called for trial. There were, however, forty abstentions.
1

the Civil Jury, in

176

[1968] 1 Ont. 536.

77

Id. at 537. The implication seems apparent in the following passage:
It is obvious from the record that the trial judge was convinced that
every effort should be explored to achieve a settlement in the case and that
the case was of a nature warranting genuine efforts of settlement. Be that
as it may, it is equally obvious to us upon the record that the Judge permitted himself, in his remarks, spread throughout the record, to go beyond
judicial consideration of the appropriateness of settlement and permitted
himself in the remarks he saw fit to make before even the first witness for
the defence was called to pass into the area of pre-judgment of the case or
at least to give that appearance.
1

178 Id.
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It was quite apparent from the record that the trial judge had

seen fit to read the examination for discovery of one of the parties prior to
its admission into evidence. '" While clearly improper, it is generally impossible to know how frequently judges indulge in this practice since it will
only become apparent if he makes a comment during the trial which reveals
the fact. The possibility of judges reading these documents before trial
results from the general practice, at least in Ontario, of filing with the
court180 a copy of the examinations for discovery in addition to the pleadings
and other papers in the action. There is a feeling at least among some trial
counsel that some judges read the discoveries prior to the action, and perhaps it is desirable that the practice of filing these documents in advance with
the court should be discontinued. 1,1 Nothing of value would be lost by
such a step. Counsel could come prepared with an extra copy of the examinations for discovery, and if and when any part of these were adduced
in evidence, copies could then be furnished to the presiding judge.
The Majcenic case " and Bell v. Smith, 1 which was a later case that
reached the Supreme Court of Canada, pointed out a further aspect of the
conduct of trials that is often overlooked. It is imperative that a record be
made of all aspects of the trial including discussions that take place in the
judge's chambers. In both the above cases, the trial judge had conducted
discussions in his chambers in the absence of a court reporter and without
recording the conclusions reached in these discussions, and in each case, on
appeal, what exactly had been said or agreed to at those discussions came
into issue. " As the trial record did not contain a transcript of the pro29 [1968] 1 Ont. at 537.
' 80 We are informed that, at least in Toronto, the examinations for discovery are
not usually or automatically transmitted to the trial judge. They are sent on the eve
of trial from the central office to the court clerk, and to obtain them, the judge would
have to specifically request them.
81Judges must face a considerable temptation to read the examinations for discovery in preparing for, at least, a personal injuries case. In such cases, the pleadings
invariably include a swath of allegations and particulars of negligence or contributory
negligence, only a few of which will be genuinely in issue at trial. A quick perusal
of the discoveries will generally reveal which of the allegations will be seriously pursued at trial.
21

[1968] 1 Ont. 199 (1967).

1&68 D.LR.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
1"Bell v. Smith, id. There was no complete record of what had transpired in
open court. See, e.g., the Bell case, id. at 756. In addition, further confusion was
created by the lack of any written reasons of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
The entire case was a "tragedy of errors." It arose out of a settlement initially
agreed to by the plaintiffs and from which they shortly thereafter resiled on being told,
so they alleged, by their counsel that he would be charging them a solicitor-client fee
equal to ten per cent of the settlement, in addition to a similar amount of costs payable
to him as part of the settlement. The defendants moved for judgment in accordance
with this settlement. On the hearing of this motion, the defendants subpoenaed plaintiffs' original counsel who had negotiated the settlement (the plaintiffs had by the time
of the hearing changed solicitors). This counsel proceeded to testify and to produce
his complete file-all of which was privileged as against the plaintiffs--without either
him or defendant's counsel or the judge obtaining the plaintiffs' waiver of the privilege.
Later in the hearing, the judge requested to be allowed to (and did) speak with the
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ceedings which had taken place in chambers, counsel filed affidavits concerning what had been said. 18 In both cases the recollections of counsel
were in conflict.
The Supreme Court of Canada and the Ontario Court of Appeal each
pointed out the obviously unsatisfactory position of the appellate court in
such circumstances because it is invited to choose between the conflicting
statements under oath of members of the bar. 18 Both courts recommended
that to avoid this problem in the future the trial judge should either hear
argument in open court in the absence of the jury or have the reporter in
chambers to record the discussion. "' The Ontario Court of Appeal suggested that as a minimum precaution the reporter should be called in with
counsel present to record the conclusions agreed upon. 188
"Justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done."
While this maxim usually carries with it an almost metaphorical connotation,
taken literally it aptly summarizes the ruling in Springman v. Darragh.189
In that case, the "judicial misconduct" consisted of the judge hearing a landlord's application for a writ of possession in his private chambers with both
the public and press excluded. On appeal, Mr. Justice Freedman, speaking
for the Manitoba Court of Appeal, ruled that such conduct violated the
fundamental principle of .the administration of justice that courts must be
open to the public. While accepting this basic principle, the landlord's
counsel contended that the particular case fell within an exception to this
rule, it being a chambers' matter. Without determining whether there was
a general exception for all or any chambers' matters, Mr. Justice Freedman
remitted the case for another hearing on the ground that an application for
an order for a writ of possession is, in fact, a trial and not a motion in chambers and must be heard in open court.
plaintiffs personally in his chambers in the absence of their counsel. Finally the judge
entered, or purported to enter, judgment for the plaintiffs on the basis of the minutes of
settlement filed, though none were filed. The plaintiffs appealed, unsuccessfully, to the
Ontario Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court of Canada, to have the judgment set aside and to have the case set down for trial. The Supreme Court of Canada
condemned virtually every step in the proceeding and allowed the plaintiffs' appeal.
"IsSee Bell v. Smith, 68 D.L.R.2d 751, at 756 (1968). The Supreme Court of
Canada, quoting from 3 HALSBuRY, LAWS OF ENoLAND 68 (3d ed. 1959) referring to
the ANNUAL STATEMENT OF THE GENERAL CouNciL. OF THE BAR 7 (1937), pointed out
that "[c]ounsel should not give a proof of evidence of what occurred at a hearing in
which he was professionally engaged." However, under the circumstances of the case,
the Supreme Court felt that counsel had not acted improperly in attempting to properly
discharge their duty to their clients by submitting affidavits in evidence.
'88Majcenic v. Natale, [1968] 1 Ont. 199, at 202 (1967). The court declined
to deal with that part of the unrecorded discussions in chambers on the ground that
counsel were not in agreement as to what took place.
In the Bell case, 68 D.L.R.2d at 756-57, the court dealt with matters that were unrecorded and to which counsel were not in agreement, e.g., as to whether plaintiffs'
trial counsel had objected to plaintiffs' original counsel testifying.
187Majeenic v. Natale, [1968] 1 Ont. 199, at 200 (1967); Bell v. Smith, 68
D.L.R.2d 751, at 758 (1968).
188[1968] 1 Ont. 199, at 201 (1967).
189 1 D.L.R.3d 250 (Man. 1968).
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The question of whether there is a general exception to the principle of
public hearing for all or any chambers' matter was left unresolved by the
Manitoba Court in Springman v. Darragh. This question would be a relevant factor in passing judgment on the propriety of the conduct of certain
proceedings described recently in the Toronto press. ," Regrettably, there
appears to be no one with both the standing and the desire to question the
conduct of the proceedings, and they will escape judicial review.
The proceedings arose out of the request by a shareholder, Adams, to
the Clairtone Sound Corporation to sue its former president, Munk, for the
recovery of stock market profits allegedly made by the use of "inside" information. 191 Upon the corporation's refusal, Adams sought the recourse provided by section 71(e) of the Ontario Corporations Act. " He applied to
the Supreme Court for an order requiring the Ontario Securities Commission
to commence an action on behalf of the corporation. According to the newspaper accounts of these proceedings," it was the desire of at least several
of the interested parties that the matter be kept as quiet as possible. Unfortunately, through oversight or deliberate acts, the court officials lent assistance to the parties in this plan. The papers relating to the originating
motion were handled in such a way that at the time the proceedings were
underway the clerks in the Supreme Court office were unable to find any
records indicating that the proceedings had ever been commenced. '"' To
compound matters, Mr. Justice Stewart held hearings on the application in
his private offices rather than in open court. The proceedings only came
into public view, after their termination, at a press conference called by the
Chairman of the Ontario Securities Commission at which he made available
to reporters duplicate copies of the court documents in the action. "
Since the application terminated in a settlement acceptable to all
the directly interested parties, it seems unlikely that the conduct of the
proceedings will be subject to judicial review. However, the conduct
of the proceedings has been roundly condemned by the Chairman of the
Ontario Securities Commission'" and by one Toronto newspaper. ', The
190

The proceedings and their conduct were the subject of a two part article by
Dow, Assistant Financial Editor, in the Toronto Daily Star, June 24, 1969, at 14, cots.
1-6 and June 25, 1969, at 18, cols. 3-5.
The same newspaper ran an editorial, June 24, 1969, at 6, cols. 1-2, critical of the
conduct of proceedings and calling for an "explanation . . .for this extraordinary procedure."
191 Such an action is specifically granted by An Act to amend The Corporations
Act, Ont. Stat. 1966 c. 28, § 3, amending The Corporations Act, ONT. REv. STAT. c. 71,
§ 71 (1960).
9
1 2 Id.

20 Supra note 190.
194During the period of the proceedings, all of the papers were evidently in Mr.
Justice Stewart's office, Toronto Daily Star, June 25, at 18, cols. 3-5. The situation
was exacerbated in the eyes of the press by the fact that the lawyers of the parties
refused to admit that the matter was before the courts.
195Toronto Daily Star, June 24, 1969, at 6, cols. 1-2 and June 25, 1969, at 18,
cols. 3-5.
19
6Id.
'11

Supra note 190.
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result is that the administration of justice has been brought into disrepute.
In these circumstances it is to be hoped that the Chief Justice of the High
Court will see to it, through admonitions and any necessary changes in
administrative practice, that such clandestine proceedings do not reoccur.
The particular proceedings in Clairtone were ones required by the rules
to be heard by a judge in chambers. "' Because of the obvious public
interest in the subject matter, the proceedings were ones that most certainly
should have been heard in open court. 19' This case provides good reason
for not adopting a blanket exception from the principle of public hearings
for chambers' matters. In only the most exceptional cases should judicial
proceedings be conducted otherwise than publicly. Quite understandably,
the public is very suspicious of in camera proceedings unless a very good
reason is given for such a mode of conduct. In Clairtone none has been
forthcoming. " To be seen to be done, justice must be done where it
can be seen; the court papers should be a matter of public record; the public should be able to ascertain when and where a hearing will take place; and
the hearing itself should be one from which the public is not excluded.
One final development in the area of judicial conduct of trials deserves
brief mention. In 1967, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gray v. Alanco
Developments Ltd. 201 ruled that it was not permissible for a trial judge to
express to the jury an opinion as to the monetary value of the plaintiff's
general damages. 202 In so doing, the court followed Ward v. James, "I a
1965 English Court of Appeal decision. Recently, the Supreme Court of
Canada in Byron v. Williams 04 expressly reserved the decision in Alanco
Developments "for further consideration when the occasion arises." "I Although the trial judge in Byron v. Williams had mentioned certain figures to
the jury which could have been interpreted as an expression by the judge of
198 ONT.

R.P. 209(18).

is not acceptable to argue that in camera court proceedings are tolerable
when they result in settlement, on the ground that, had the parties settled their dispute
without resort to judicial intervention, nobody would or need have known of the allegations. If parties wish to keep the details of their disputes from public scrutiny, then
they should stay out of the courts. The administration of justice cannot afford the
injury to its reputation that clandestine legal proceedings bring.
200 A journalist's request of Mr. Justice Stewart for an explanation for the conduct
of the proceedings met with a response from a secretary that "Mr. Justice Stewart is
not available to speak to you with reference to Clairtone," Toronto Daily Star, Juno
25, 1969, at 18, cols. 3-5.
199It

201 [19671 1 Ont. 597, 61 D.L.R.2d 652.

202 Id. The Court of Appeal also ruled that it was impermissible for counsel to
mention figures to the jury in an attempt to quantify general damages. Recently, that
court reaffirmed its condemnation of this practice in Allan v. Bushnell T.V. Co., [19691
2 Ont. 6. For an interesting division of opinion on the question of what amounts to
an attempt by counsel to quantify general damages, see Didluck v. Evans, 67 D.L.R.2d
411 (Sask. 1968).
203[1965] 2 W.L.R. 455, [1965] 1 All. E.R. 563 (C.A.).
2-467 D.L.R.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1968). Gray Alanco Dev. Ltd., supra note 201,
and Byron v. Williams, supra note 204, are discussed in Watson, Comment, 48 CAN.

B. REv. 565 (1970).
2

1d. at 118-19.
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his opinion as to the range of damages,-o' the Court upheld the judgment
and thus avoided consideration of Alanco Developments, on the ground that
in all the circumstances the jury's assessment was reasonable.
It would seem then that the Supreme Court has reservations about the
prohibition of the Alanco Developments decision. It is to be hoped that the
Court will soon be presented with, and will seize, an opportunity to deal with
the merits of this prohibition.

...
The action was one brought by a wife under the Fatal Accidents Act for
damages for the death of her husband who was killed in an automobile collision with
the defendant's car. The figures mentioned by the trial judge were made in the context
of discussing the effect to be given to an actuary's evidence as to the husband's life
expectancy and the amount necessary to purchase an annuity. In his separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Ritchie distinguished the Alanco Developments case as
being restricted to forbidding judicial expressions of opinion as to damages for pain
and suffering or for the loss of amenities of life, i.e., those cases in which there can
be no evidence as to the value in monetary terms of the loss sustained. See 67 D.LR.2d
at 112. The majority opinion by Mr. Justice Hall did not discuss the Alanco Developments decision at all beyond stating that the case was decided "without reference" to
the Alanco Developments decision which he reserved for later consideration.

